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1 Introduction to synthetic spaces
There are so many different notions of “space” (e.g. topological spaces, mani-
folds, schemes, stacks, and so on, as discussed in various other chapters of this
book) that one might despair of finding any common thread tying them to-
gether. However, one property shared by many notions of space is that they
can be “background” structure. For instance, many kinds of algebraic objects,
such as groups, rings, lattices, Boolean algebras, etc., often come with “extra
space structure” that is respected by all their operations. In the case of groups,
we have topological groups, Lie groups, sheaves of groups,∞-groups, and so on.
For each kind of “spatial group”, much of the theory of ordinary groups
generalizes directly, with the “extra space structure” simply “coming along for
the ride”. Additionally, many naturally arising groups, such as the real and
complex numbers, matrix groups, the p-adic numbers, profinite groups, loop
spaces, and so on, come “naturally” with spatial structure, and usually it would
be ridiculous to study them without taking that spatial structure into account.
On the other hand, “ordinary” groups are the special case of “spatial groups”
whose spatial structure is trivial (e.g. discrete); but certain natural constructions
on groups, such as the Pontryagin dual, profinite completion, or delooping, take
us out of the discrete world. Thus, the theory of “groups with spatial structure”
subsumes, and in a sense “completes”, the study of ordinary groups. Similar
statements can be made about many other kinds of algebraic structure.
With this in mind, the idea of synthetic spaces can be summarized as fol-
lows: if all objects in mathematics come naturally with spatial structure, then
it is perverse to insist on defining them first in terms of bare sets, as is the
official foundational position of most mathematicians, and only later equipping
them with spatial structure. Instead, we can replace set theory with a different
∗This material is based on research sponsored by The United States Air Force Research
Laboratory under agreement number FA9550-15-1-0053. The U.S. Government is authorized
to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copy-
right notation thereon. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the author
and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements,
either expressed or implied, of the United States Air Force Research Laboratory, the U.S. Gov-
ernment, or Carnegie Mellon University.
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formal system whose basic objects are spaces. Since spaces admit most of the
same constructions that sets do (such as products, disjoint unions, exponential
objects, and so on), we can develop mathematics in such a system with very
few changes to its outward appearance, but all the desired spatial structure will
automatically be present and preserved. (In fact, as we will see in §2.8, this can
even be regarded as an explanation of why many objects in mathematics come
naturally with spatial structure.) Moreover, if our formal system is sufficiently
general, then its objects will be interpretable as many different kinds of space;
thus the same theorems about “groups” will apply to topological groups, Lie
groups, sheaves of groups, ∞-groups, and so on.
A formal system with these properties is Martin–Lo¨f dependent type the-
ory [83, 84]. Originally conceived as a constructive foundation for mathematics
where everything has “computational” content, it turns out to also admit “spa-
tial” interpretations. This connection between constructivity/computability
and topology/continuity goes back at least to Brouwer, and was gradually de-
veloped by many people.1 It was originally restricted to particular topologies
on computational data types, but eventually broadened to the realization that
types could be interpreted as almost any kind of space. Categorically speaking,
each “kind of space” forms a topos or something like it (a category that shares
many properties of the category of sets), and the interpretation proceeds by way
of constructing a “free topos” from the syntax of type theory (see §2).
There are other formal systems that can be interpreted in toposes, such
as Intuitionistic Higher-Order Logic. Dependent type theory has some minor
advantages of convenience, but more importantly, it has recently been recog-
nized [10, 63] to also admit interpretations in higher toposes. More concretely,
this means we can also interpret its basic objects as homotopy spaces, a.k.a.∞-
groupoids. The resulting collection of new axioms and techniques is known as
homotopy type theory [111] or univalent foundations [116]. It includes synthetic
homotopy theory which studies homotopical objects “directly” without the need
for topological spaces, simplicial sets, or any other combinatorial gadget. Like
any new perspective on a subject, synthetic homotopy theory suggests new ways
to attack problems; it has already led to new proofs of known theorems.
Classically, ∞-groupoids arose to prominence gradually, as repositories for
the homotopy-theoretic information contained in a topological space; see Porter’s
chapter for an extensive survey. As we will see, however, the synthetic viewpoint
emphasizes that this structure of a “homotopy space” is essentially orthogonal
to other kinds of space structure, so that an object can be both “homotopical”
and (for example) “topological” or “smooth” in unrelated ways. This sort of
mixed structure is visible in many other chapters of the present volume, such as
those about Lie groupoids (Pradines), toposes (Joyal), and stacks (Mestrano–
Simpson). It is also central to many applications, such as differential cohomology
and gauge field theory (e.g. Schreiber’s chapter). Finally, it describes cleanly
how topological and smooth spaces give rise to homotopy ones (see §5).
1Escardo´ [39] cites “Kleene, Kreisel, Myhill/Shepherdson, Rice/Shapiro, Nerode, Scott,
Ershov, Plotkin, Smyth, Abramsky, Vickers, Weihrauch and no doubt many others”.
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This chapter is intended as a brief introduction to the above ideas: type
theory, synthetic spaces, and homotopy type theory. Of course many details
will be left out, but I hope to convey a flavor of the subject, and leave the
reader with some idea of what it means to talk about the logic of space.
It should be emphasized that homotopy type theory, in particular, is a very
new subject. Many of its basic definitions are still in flux, and some of its
expected fundamental theorems have not yet been completely proven. In general
I will focus on what is expected to be true, in order to emphasize the possibilities
opened up by these ideas; but I will endeavor not to lie, and to include some
remarks on the current state of the art as well.
I will begin in §2 with an introduction to type theory. Then in §§3 and 4 I
will discuss its spatial and homotopical aspects respectively and some of their
applications. Finally, in §5 I will briefly mention how these aspects are combined.
For further reading, I recommend [6, 9, 89, 102] and [111].
I would like to thank Peter LeFanu Lumsdaine, Steve Awodey, and Urs
Schreiber, as well as the editors of the volume, for careful reading and helpful
comments.
2 Type theory
2.1 On syntax
Mathematicians often have a lot of difficulty understanding type theory (and
the author was no exception). One reason is that the usual presentation of type
theory is heavy on syntax, which most mathematicians are not used to thinking
about. Thus, it is appropriate to begin with a few general remarks about syntax,
what it is, and its role in type theory and in mathematics more generally.2
In general, syntax refers to a system of formal symbols of some sort, whereas
semantics means the interpretation of those symbols as “things”. In the lan-
guage of category theory, we can generally think of syntax as describing a free
(or presented) object, and semantics as the morphisms out of that object deter-
mined by its universal property.
For instance, in group theory we may write a sequence of equations such as
(gh)h−1 = g(hh−1) = ge = g. (2.1)
Where does this computation take place? One obvious answer is “in an ar-
bitrary group”. But another is “in the free group F 〈g, h〉 generated by two
symbols g and h.” Since the elements of F 〈g, h〉 are literally strings of symbols
(“words”) produced by multiplication and inversion from g and h, strings such
as “(gh)h−1” are themselves elements of F 〈g, h〉, and (2.1) holds as an equality
between these elements, i.e. a statement in syntax. Now if we have any other
group G and two elements of it, there is a unique group homomorphism from
F 〈g, h〉 to G sending the letters g and h to the chosen elements of G. This is
2The “algebraic” perspective I will present is only one of many valid ways to look at type
theory. It has been developed by [38, 67, 107, 118] among others.
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the semantics of our syntax, and it carries the equation (2.1) in F 〈g, h〉 to the
analogous equation in G. Such reasoning can be applied to arguments involving
hypotheses, such as “if g2 = e, then g4 = (g2)2 = e2 = e”, by considering (in
this case) the group F 〈g | g2 = e〉 presented by one generator g and one equation
g2 = e. (A free group, of course, has a presentation with no equations.)
In other words, we can regard an argument such as (2.1) either as a “se-
mantic” statement about “all groups” or as a “syntactic” statement about a
particular free or presented group. The former is a consequence of the latter,
by the universal property of free groups and presentations.
This may seem like mere playing with words,3 and the reader may wonder
how such a viewpoint could ever gain us anything. The reason is that often, we
can say more about a free object than is expressed tautologically by its universal
property.4 Usually, this takes the form of an explicit and tractable construction
of an object that is then proven to be free. Of course, any construction of a free
object must be proven correct, but such a proof can range from tautological to
highly nontrivial. The less trivial it is, the more potential benefit there is from
working syntactically with the free object.
For instance, a “tautological” way to define F 〈g, h〉 is by “throwing in freely”
the group operations of multiplication and inversion, obtaining formal “words”
such as (gg−1)(h−1(hg)), and then quotienting by an equivalence relation gen-
erated by the axioms of a group. The universal property of a free group is then
essentially immediate. But a more interesting and useful construction of F 〈g, h〉
consists of “reduced words” in g, h, and their formal inverses (finite sequences
in which no cancellation is possible), such as ghg−1g−1hhgh−1, with multiplica-
tion by concatenation and cancellation. The proof that this yields a free group
is not entirely trivial (indeed, even the definition of the group multiplication is
not completely trivial); but once we know it, it can simplify our lives.
As a fairly banal example of such a simplification, recall that the conjugation
of h by g is defined by hg = ghg−1. Here is a proof that conjugation by g is a
group homomorphism:
hg kg = (ghg−1)(gkg−1) = ghkg−1 = (hk)g (2.2)
As straightforward as it is, this is not, technically, a complete proof from the
usual axioms of a group. For that, we would have to choose parenthesizations
and use the associativity and unit axioms explicitly:
hgkg = ((gh)g−1)((gk)g−1) = (g(hg−1))((gk)g−1) = ((g(hg−1))(gk))g−1
= (g((hg−1)(gk)))g−1 = (g(h(g−1(gk))))g−1 = (g(h((g−1g)k)))g−1
= (g(h(ek)))g−1 = (g(hk))g−1 = (hk)g (2.3)
Of course, this would be horrific, so no one ever does it. If mathematicians
think about this sort of question at all, they usually call (2.2) an “acceptable
3No pun intended.
4This is dual to the familiar fact that studying a “classifying space” can yield insights about
the objects it classifies — a classifying space being a representing object for a contravariant
functor, while a free or presented object represents a covariant one.
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abuse of notation”. But with the above explicit description of free groups, we
can make formal sense of (2.2) as a calculation in F 〈g, h, k〉, wherein ghg−1 and
gkg−1 are specific elements whose product is ghkg−1. Then we can extend this
conclusion to every other group by freeness. Note that if we tried to do the
same thing with the “tautological” presentation of a free group, we would be
forced to write down (2.3) instead, so no simplification would result.
In general, there are several ways that a presentation of a free object might
make our lives easier. One is if its elements are “canonical forms”, as for free
groups (e.g. ghkg−1 is the canonical form of ((gh)g−1)((gk)g−1)). This elimi-
nates (or simplifies) the quotient by an equivalence relation required for “tau-
tological” constructions. Often there is a “reduction” algorithm to compute
canonical forms, making equality in the free object computationally decidable.
Another potential advantage is if we obtain a “version” of a free object that
is actually simpler. For instance, it might be stricter than the one given by a
tautological construction. This is particularly common in category theory and
higher category theory, where it can be called a coherence theorem.
Finally, a particular construction of a free object might also be psycholog-
ically easier to work with, or at least suggest a different viewpoint that may
lead to new insights. The best example of this is type theory itself: though it
also offers the advantages of canonical forms and strictness (see §§3.3 and 4.A),
arguably its most important benefit is a way of thinking.
2.2 Universes of mathematics
What, then, is type theory?5 Roughly speaking, it is a particularly convenient
construction of free objects for the theory of all of mathematics. Just as a
group presented by g, h and gh = hg admits a unique homomorphism to any
other group equipped with two commuting elements, type theory with certain
structures presents “a universe of mathematics” with a unique “mathematics-
homomorphism” to any other such universe of mathematics.
This discussion of “universes of mathematics” may sound odd; surely there
is only one universe of mathematics? Well, yes, mathematics is a whole; but it
has been known since the early 20th century that some formal systems, such
as Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, can encode almost all of mathematics. To
first approximation, by a “universe of mathematics” I mean a model of a formal
system in which mathematics can be encoded. Note that Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem ensures that any such system has many different models.6 Thus, there
are many “universes of mathematics” in this sense.
5Unfortunately, the phrase “type theory” has many different meanings. On the one hand,
type theory is a discipline lying at the boundary of mathematics and computer science. This
discipline studies deductive systems that are themselves also known as type theories. But in
the context of mathematical foundations, such as here, “type theory” generally refers to a
particular subclass of these deductive systems, which are more precisely called dependent type
theories (because they admit “dependent types”; see below.)
6Specifically, it shows that any sufficiently powerful formal system contains statements that
are neither provable nor disprovable. The completeness theorem then implies that there must
be some models in which these statements are true and some in which they are false.
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Often the incompleteness theorem is seen as a bug, but from our point of
view it is actually a feature! We can make positive use of it by recognizing
that certain mathematical structures, like notions of space, happen to form
new universes of mathematics by themselves. In other words, starting from
one universe of mathematics,7 we can construct another universe whose objects
are, from the point of view of our original universe, “spaces” of some sort.
Thus, when a mathematician living in this new world constructs a bare function
A→ B between sets, the mathematician in the old world sees that it is in fact
a continuous function between spaces.
This is admittedly a bit vague, so let me pass to a second approximation of
what I mean by a “universe of mathematics”: a category, or (∞, 1)-category,
with certain structure. Our starting universe is then the category of sets (or
perhaps the (∞, 1)-category of ∞-groupoids). Thus, type theory gives a way
to construct free or presented objects in some category of structured categories.
Such a free object is sometimes called the “syntactic category” or “classifying
category” of the type theory. In the words of Scott [99]:
. . . a category represents the “algebra of types”, just as abstract rings
give us the algebra of polynomials, originally understood to concern
only integers or rationals.
Now the usual way of working “inside” a particular category is to write all
arguments in diagrammatic language. For instance, if G is a group object in a
category (such as a topological group in the category of topological spaces, or a
Lie group in the category of smooth manifolds), then the argument analogous
to (2.1) would be the commutativity of the following diagram:
G×G
1×∆ //
proj1

G×G×G
1×1×inv // G×G×G
mult×1 //
1×mult

G×G
mult

G
1×id //
1
66G×G
mult // G
(2.4)
Categorically trained mathematicians become quite adept at translating calcu-
lations like (2.1) into diagrams like (2.4). However, objectively I think it is
hard to deny the relative simplicity of (2.1) compared to (2.4). The benefits are
magnified further when we include additional simplifications like those in (2.2).
Type theory allows us to use equations like (2.1) and (2.2) to prove things
about all group objects in all categories. Its syntax involves elements with
operations and equations, so we can speak and think as if we were talking
about ordinary sets. But it is nevertheless a description of a free category of a
certain sort,8 so that its theorems can be uniquely mapped into any other similar
7We may regard the starting universe as the “true” one, but there is no formal justification
for this. We will come back to this in §6.
8See §§2.5 and 4.A for some caveats to this statement.
6
category. Thus, type theory supplies a different perspective on categories that
is often more familiar and easier to work with.
To be a little more precise, the benefit here comes from the interplay between
two modes of interacting with type theory. On one hand, we can define and
study the formal system of type theory inside mathematics. This enables us
to talk about its having multiple models, and hence functioning as a syntax for
categories, as described above. But on the other hand, because type theory is
sufficiently powerful to encode all of mathematics, we are also free to regard
it as the “ambient foundation” for any mathematical theory. Most modern
mathematicians implicitly assume set theory as a foundation, but for the most
part type theory is just as good (and, as we will see in §4, it makes “new kinds
of mathematics” possible as well). Of course, real-world mathematics is rarely
“fully encoded” into any foundational system, but experience shows that it is
always possible in principle, and nowadays with computer proof assistants it is
becoming more common and feasible to do explicitly.
The point, then, is that any theorem in “ordinary” mathematics can be
encoded using the second “foundational” point of view, obtaining a derivation
in the formal system of type theory; but then we can switch to the first “se-
mantic” point of view and conclude that that theorem is actually true (suitably
interpreted) in all categories with appropriate structure. In this way, any math-
ematical theorem is actually much more general than it appears.9
2.3 Types versus sets
With those lengthy preliminaries out of the way, let’s move on to what type
theory actually looks like. If it is to describe the free “universe of mathematics”,
type theory should be a formal system into which mathematics can be encoded.
The currently accepted formal system for encoding mathematics is Zermelo–
Fraenkel set theory (ZFC), and mathematicians have a great deal of practice
representing structures as sets. Thus it makes sense that the basic objects of
type theory, called types, are very set-like — with one important difference.
In ZFC, an assertion of membership like “x ∈ A” is a statement about two
previously given objects x and A, which might be true or false, and can be
hypothesized, proven, or disproven. In other words, the universe of ZFC is a
vast undifferentiated collection of things called “sets”, with a relation called
“membership” that can be applied to any two of them. By contrast, in type
theory, the type to which an element belongs is “part of its nature”, rather
than something we can ask about and prove or disprove; two distinct types can
never10 share any elements in common. To emphasize this difference, we write
x : A, rather than x ∈ A, to mean that x is an element of the type A.
This perspective on sets is like that of categorical or “structural” set theory,
such as Lawvere’s ETCS [71, 74], which axiomatizes the category of sets and
9However, as we will see in §3.2, it requires some care on the side of ordinary mathematics —
specifically, avoiding certain restrictive logical axioms — to maximize this resulting generality.
10As with almost any general statement about type theory, there are exceptions to this, but
for the most part it is true.
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functions. It contrasts with membership-based or “material” set theory such
as ZFC, which axiomatizes the class of sets and its membership relation. The
structural approach generalizes better when thinking of the basic objects as
spaces rather than bare sets, since the spatial relationships between points are
specified by an ambient space: it doesn’t make sense to ask whether two points
are “nearby” unless we have fixed some space in which they both reside.
In principle it may be possible to use a more ZFC-like formal system for at
least some of the same purposes as type theory (see e.g. [8]), but the connection
to spaces would become rather more tenuous. Moreover, the structural perspec-
tive matches the usage of “sets” in most of mathematics. Outside the formal
theory of ZFC, the primary place where one element can belong to more than
one set, or where elements of distinct sets are compared, is when the given sets
are subsets of some ambient set. This situation is encoded in type theory by a
notion of “subset of A” that, like “element of A”, is a basic notion not reducible
to something like “set that happens to be a subset of A”; see §3.1.
While we are talking about ZFC and set theory, it is worth mentioning
another reason type theory is often difficult for mathematicians. Any formal
system for encoding mathematics, be it ZFC, ETCS, or type theory, must by
its nature be careful about many things that mathematicians usually gloss over.
Ordinary mathematical notation and writing is, technically speaking, ambiguous
and full of gaps, trusting the human reader to draw “obvious” conclusions. But
to give a mathematical theory of mathematics (and in particular, to prove things
like “type theory presents a free structured category”), we have to remove all
such ambiguity and fill in all the gaps. This causes the syntactic formulas of
the formal system to appear quite verbose, and often barely comprehensible to
a mathematician accustomed to informal mathematical language.
The important points are that this is true for all formal systems, and that
it should not bother us when doing ordinary mathematics. The process of
“encoding” mathematics into a formal system such as ZFC, ETCS, or type
theory looks somewhat different depending on which formal system is chosen,
but it is generally well understood. In particular, no matter what formal system
we choose, there is no need for its verbosity to infect ordinary mathematics; we
remain free to “abuse notation” in the usual way.
I stress this point because one sometimes encounters a false impression that
type theory requires “heavier syntax” than set-based mathematics, or that it
forbids “abuse of notation”. This is probably partly because type theory is
often presented in a very formal and syntactic way — perhaps because many
type theorists are logicians or computer scientists — whereas most mathemati-
cians’ exposure to set theory has been fairly informal and intuitive. Moreover,
the particular notations used in type theory are somewhat unfamiliar to math-
ematicians, and take some practice to learn to read correctly. But the syntax
of type theory is intrinsically no heavier or unabusable than that of set theory.
(Promoting a style of informal mathematics that matches the formal system of
type theory was one of the explicit goals of [111].)
8
2.4 Judgments and the classifying category
Finally, we are ready to describe the syntax of type theory and how it generates a
category (which we will call the classifying category; it is also called the syntactic
category and the category of contexts). Like the elements of a free group, the
syntactic objects of type theory are “words” built out of operations. In a free
group there is only one sort of word, since a group involves only one collection
of “things” (its elements). But since type theory presents a category with both
objects and morphisms, it has at least two sorts of “words”. Type theorists call
a “sort of word” a judgment form, and a particular word a judgment.
The first judgment form is a type judgment ; it is written “B type” and
pronounced “B is a type”. Here B is a syntactic expression like N× (R+Q), in
which × and + are operations on types, formally analogous to the multiplication
of elements represented by concatenation of words in a free group; we will come
back to them in §2.5. The objects of the “classifying category” generated by a
type theory are11 the syntactic expressions B for which the judgment B type can
be produced by the rules (i.e. operations) to be described in §2.5. For clarity,
we will write JBK when B is regarded as an object of this category, and say that
B presents the object JBK.
The second judgment form is a term judgment, written “b : B”. Here B is a
syntactic expression for a type (i.e. we must also have “B type”). For instance,
we might have (3 · 2+1, inr(34 − 17)) : N× (R+Q).Here again, ·,+,−, inr and so
on denote operations that will be described in §2.5. We pronounce b : B as “b is
an element of B” or “b is a point of B” or “b is a term of type B”, emphasizing
respectively the set-like, space-like, or syntactic character of B.
More generally, a term judgment can include a context, consisting of a list of
variables, each with a specified type, that may occur in the term b. For instance,
we might also write (3x+ 1, inr(34 − y)) : N× (R+Q), which only makes sense
in the context of x : N and y : Q. The traditional notation in type theory is to
write the context as a list of variables with their types, joined by commas, and
separate it from the judgment with the symbol ⊢ (called a turnstile). Thus, the
above judgment would be written
x : N, y : Q ⊢ (3x+ 1, inr(34 − y)) : N× (R+Q)
Here the ⊢ is the “outer relation” that binds most loosely; then the commas on
the left-hand side bind next most loosely, separating the (variable : type) pairs.
Thus, for emphasis it could be bracketed as
((x : N), (y : Q)) ⊢ ((3x+ 1, inr(34 − y)) : N× (R+Q)).
Often the Greek letter Γ denotes an arbitrary context, so that Γ, x : A ⊢ b : B
(to be parsed as (Γ, (x : A)) ⊢ (b : B)) means that in some arbitrary context
together with a variable x of type A, we have a term b of type B.12
11Well, not exactly; see below.
12Technically, Γ, b, A, and B here are “meta-variables”, not to be confused with the “vari-
ables” such as x in a context. We will come back to this in §2.5.
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Term judgments Γ ⊢ a : A present morphisms in the classifying category.
In the simplest case, Γ contains only one variable, such as x : A ⊢ b : B, and
this morphism JbK is from JAK to JBK. For the general case Γ ⊢ a : A, we have
to modify our definition of the classifying category by taking its objects to be
contexts rather than types, with our previous JAK corresponding to Jx : AK; then
Γ ⊢ a : A presents a morphism from JΓK to JAK. For this reason, the classifying
category is also known as the category of contexts ; we denote it by Ctx.
We stipulate that JΓK is a product of the types in Γ, so Jx : A, y : BK ∼=
JAK× JBK and so on. (In particular, the empty context yields a terminal object
J K.) Thus, for instance, x : R, y : R ⊢ xy : R yields the multiplication map
R × R → R. The universal property of products implies that for contexts Γ
and ∆, a morphism in Ctx from JΓK to a general context J∆K must consist of
a tuple of term judgments Γ ⊢ bi : Bi for all variables yi : Bi occurring in ∆. If
we also have ∆ ⊢ c : C, we get another term judgment denoted
Γ ⊢ c[b1/y1, . . . , bm/ym] : C
by substituting each bi for yi in c; this presents the composite JΓK → J∆K → JCK.
For instance, we have a morphism from Jx : RK to Jz : R, w : RK defined by the
terms x : R ⊢ (x − 1) : R and x : R ⊢ (x + 1) : R; substituting it into
z : R, w : R ⊢ zw : R gives x : R ⊢ (x − 1)(x+ 1) : R. That is,
(zw)[(x− 1)/z, (x+ 1)/w] = (x− 1)(x+ 1).
So far, we have described simple type theory. Next we allow type judgments
“B type” to have a context as well, making B into a dependent type or type
family. Intuitively, a dependent type “Γ ⊢ B type” presents an object of the
slice category Ctx/JΓK, i.e. an object with a morphism to JΓK. We think of the
“fiber” over a point of JΓK as the instance of B corresponding to that point.
For instance, in informal mathematics we might speak of “an arbitrary finite
cyclic group Cn”, for n : N+. In type theory this becomes n : N+ ⊢ Cn type, cor-
responding categorically to
∐
n∈N+
Cn with its projection to N+. Topologically,
this is a bundle over N+, with the Cn as its fibers. Working in a category in the
style of (2.4) requires manually translating from “arbitrary objects” to bundles;
this is one of the least convenient aspects of categorical set theories and of the
traditional way of doing mathematics in a topos. The ability to talk directly
about families of types and have them interpreted automatically as bundles is
one of the most significant advantages of type theory.
A crucial fact is that substitution into a dependent type presents the pullback
functor between slice categories. For instance, we have a judgment ⊢ 3 : N+ with
no variables, yielding a context morphism from the terminal object J K to JN+K.
Substitution into n : N+ ⊢ Cn type yields the non-dependent type ⊢ C3 type,
which is the pullback of
∐
n∈N+
Cn along the inclusion 3 : J K → JN+K:
C3 //

❴
✤
∐
n∈N+
Cn

1 // N+
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As an even simpler example, if ⊢ B type is a non-dependent type, we can sub-
stitute it along the unique context morphism from any Γ to the empty context,
yielding a “trivially-dependent type” Γ ⊢ B type. This presents the pullback of
JBK to the slice over JΓK, i.e. the projection JΓK×JBK → JΓK (a “trivial bundle”):
JΓK× JBK //

❴
✤
JBK

JΓK // J K = 1
With dependent types, we can allow the type B in a term judgment Γ ⊢ b : B
to also depend on Γ. For instance, the generators of the cyclic groups form a
term judgment n : N+ ⊢ gn : Cn. Such a judgment Γ ⊢ b : B represents a section
of the projection represented by the dependent type Γ ⊢ B type: we “select one
point in each fiber”. This includes the non-dependent case because morphisms
JΓK → JBK are equivalent to sections of the projection JΓK× JBK → JΓK.
An example that will be central to the story of this entire chapter is the
diagonal map ∆JAK : JAK → JAK × JAK. We can regard this as an object of the
slice category Ctx/(JAK × JAK), or equivalently Ctx/Jx : A, y : AK; it is then
presented by a dependent type called the equality type or identity type, written
x : A, y : A ⊢ (x = y) type or x : A, y : A ⊢ Id(x, y) type.
We will explain this type in more detail in §4.1. For the moment, we observe that
it reduces equalities of terms to existence of terms. For instance, given Γ ⊢ a : A
and Γ ⊢ b : A representing morphisms JaK, JbK : JΓK → JAK, substituting them
into the equality type we get a dependent type Γ ⊢ (a = b) type that presents
the pullback of ∆JAK along (JaK, JbK) : JΓK → JAK × JAK, or equivalently the
equalizer of JaK and JbK. Thus, a judgment Γ ⊢ e : a = b says that this equalizer
has a section, or equivalently that JaK = JbK. So our type and term judgments
also suffice to present equality of morphisms.
To be precise, in the presence of dependent types we extend our previous
definition of the classifying category Ctx as follows. Firstly, we also allow the
types in a context to depend on the variables occurring earlier in the same
context. For instance, we can form the context (n : N+, x : Cn), and then
in this context write n : N+, x : Cn ⊢ x2 : Cn for the operation that squares
an arbitrary element of an arbitrary cyclic group. Categorically, if Γ ⊢ B type
presents an object of the slice over JΓK, i.e. a morphism with codomain JΓK, then
the extended context JΓ, x : BK is the domain of this morphism. This reduces
to our previous JΓ, x : BK = JΓK× JBK if B is non-dependent.
Secondly, we take the objects of Ctx to be contexts in this generalized sense,
and a morphism from JΓK to J∆K to consist of term judgments for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m:
Γ ⊢ bi : Bi[b1/y1, . . . , bi−1/yi−1]
where ∆ = (y1 : B1, y2 : B2, . . . , ym : Bm), with yj potentially occurring in Bi
for j < i. That is, we first give Γ ⊢ b1 : B1, presenting a morphism
Jb1K : JΓK → JB1K.
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Then we substitute b1 for y1 in B2, obtaining a type Γ ⊢ B2[b1/y1] and a
corresponding extended context that presents the pullback
JΓ, y2 : B2[b1/y1]K //

❴
✤
Jy1 : B1, y2 : B2K

JΓK
Jb1K
// JB1K.
Next we give Γ ⊢ b2 : B2[b1/y1], which presents a section of this pullback, or
equivalently a morphism Γ→ Jy1 : B1, y2 : B2K making this triangle commute:
Jy0 : B0, y1 : B1K

JΓK
Jb0K
//
Jb1K
77♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦
Jy0 : B0K.
Continuing in this way, the sequence of terms (b0, b1, . . . , bm) that represent a
morphism JΓK → J∆K individually present a tower of sections
Jy0 : B0, y1 : B1, . . . , ym : BmK = J∆K

...

JΓK
Jb0K **❚❚❚
❚❚❚❚
❚❚❚❚
❚❚❚
Jb1K //
JbmK
;;✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈✈
Jy0 : B0, y1 : B1K

Jy0 : B0K
with JbmK being the overall morphism JΓK → J∆K. For instance, the “squaring”
injections in : Cn →֒ C2n, represented by term judgments
n : N+ ⊢ 2n : N+ and n : N+, x : Cn ⊢ in(x) : C2n,
assemble into a morphism Jn : N+, x : CnK → Jm : N+, y : CmK. Categorically,
this is a morphism
∐
n Cn →
∐
m Cm that sends the n
th summand to the 2nth
summand.
Finally, we quotient these morphisms by an equivalence relation arising from
the identity type. In the simplest case where each context has only one type, we
identify the morphisms presented by x : A ⊢ b1 : B and x : A ⊢ b2 : B if there
is a term x : A ⊢ p : b1 = b2. The case of morphisms between arbitary contexts
is a generalization of this. (We will reconsider this last step in §§4.A–4.B.)
This completes our definition of the classifying category of a type theory. We
can now define the projection morphism JΓ, z : CK → JΓK associated to a de-
pendent type Γ ⊢ C type, exhibiting JΓ, z : CK as an object of the slice category
over JΓK, as we intended. According to the above description of morphisms, this
12
projection morphism should consist of a term in context Γ, z : C for each type
in Γ; we take these to be just the variables in Γ, ignoring z.
For instance, the projection map Jx : A, y : B, z : CK → Jx : A, y : BK is
determined by the terms x : A, y : B, z : C ⊢ x : A and x : A, y : B, z : C ⊢ y : B.
Similarly, a section of this projection consists of terms
x : A, y : B ⊢ a : A
x : A, y : B ⊢ b : B[a/x]
x : A, y : B ⊢ c : C[a/x, b/y]
such that the composite Jx : A, y : BK → Jx : A, y : B, z : CK → Jx : A, y : BK is
the identity, i.e. that a and b are the same as x and y. Thus, such a section is
simply determined by a term x : A, y : B ⊢ c : C, as we intended.
Of course, not every object of the slice category Ctx/JΓK is of this form,
but every object of Ctx/JΓK is isomorphic to one of this form. Consider the
simplest case when Γ is a single type B, and we have an object of Ctx/JBK
whose domain is also a single type A, equipped with a term x : A ⊢ f(x) : B.
Let Ψ denote the context (y : B, x : A, p : f(x) = y); then JΨK is the pullback
JΨK //

❴
✤
JBK
△JBK

JBK × JAK
1×JfK
// JBK× JBK
using the identity type y1 : B, y2 : B ⊢ (y1 = y2) type mentioned above to
present the diagonal △JBK. It is easy to see categorically that such a pullback
is isomorphic to JAK. Thus, every object of Ctx/JBK is at least isomorphic to
a composite of two projections from dependent types
Jy : B, x : A, p : f(x) = yK → Jy : B, x : AK → Jy : BK.
Using the Σ-type to be defined in §2.5, we can reduce this to one such projection:
Jy : B, z :
∑
x:A(f(x) = y)K → Jy : BK.
A similar argument works with B replaced by any context Γ. Thus we can
assume that any object of a slice category is determined by a dependent type.
2.5 Rules and universal properties
In the previous section we described the judgment forms of type theory and how
they present the classifying category, claiming that each judgment is analogous
to a word in a free group. In this section we will describe what the judgments
are for each judgment form, or more precisely how we can generate them.
The words in a free group are generated by successive application of “opera-
tions”. For the tautological description of a free group, these operations are just
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the operations of a group: multiplication, inversion, and the identity (a nullary
operation). When describing an arbitrary group we think of these operations as
defined on a fixed underlying set, but when generating a free group we instead
think of each of them as a “way to produce new elements”, usually represented
as syntactic strings of symbols. That is, the elements of the free group are all
the syntactic strings obtainable by successive application of the rules
(i) Given elements X and Y , we have an element (XY ),
(ii) Given an element X , we have an element (X−1), and
(iii) We have an element e.
Formally, this is an inductive definition: the elements are the smallest set of
syntactic strings closed under the rules. Usually we think of applying these
operations starting with a set of generators, but an equivalent description that
generalizes better is to include each generator as another nullary operation:
(iv) For any generator g, we have an element g.
That is, generators are a special case of operations. This allows us to describe the
“reduced words” version of a free group by a similar set of inductive operations:
(i) We have an element e,
(ii) For any generator g and any element X not ending with g−1, we have an
element Xg, and
(iii) For any generator g and any element X not ending with g, we have an
element Xg−1.
The judgments in type theory are likewise generated inductively by opera-
tions, which are usually called rules. Categorically, they build new objects and
morphisms from old ones, generally according to them some universal property.
For example, there is a rule saying that any two types have a coproduct (dis-
joint union). This rule applies in any context (categorically, all slice categories
inherit coproducts from the base category); type theorists write it as
Γ ⊢ A type Γ ⊢ B type
Γ ⊢ (A+B) type
(2.5)
As with judgments, this notation takes practice to read. The horizontal bar
separates the “inputs” (called premises), on top, from the “output” (or con-
clusion), on the bottom. Each input or output is a judgment-in-context, and
the inputs are separated by wide spaces or linebreaks. If the operations for the
tautological description of a free group were written analogously, they would be
X elt Y elt
(XY ) elt
X elt
(X−1) elt e elt
g is a generator
g elt
Here “X elt” is the judgment that X is an element of the free group, analogous
to the judgments “A type” and “x : A ⊢ b : B” that A is an object and b a
morphism in a free category. Note that the nullary identity operation has no
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premises. Similarly, the operations for the reduced-words description would be
e elt
X elt g is a generator X doesn’t end with g−1
(Xg) elt
X elt g is a generator X doesn’t end with g
(Xg−1) elt
The variables X and Y are analogous to Γ, A, B, and b in type theory.
We call the latter meta-variables to distinguish them from the variables x : A
occurring in a context Γ, which have no analogue in group theory.
Returning to the coproduct type A + B, for it to be worthy of the name
“coproduct”, it needs to have certain structure. There should be injections
from JAK and JBK into JA+BK, which it may seem natural to write as
x : A ⊢ inl(x) : (A+B)
and
y : B ⊢ inr(y) : (A+B)
. (2.6)
(We omit Γ ⊢ A type and Γ ⊢ B type from the premises, since these are implied13
by mention of A+B.) However, one usually uses the following rules instead:
Γ ⊢ a : A
Γ ⊢ inl(a) : (A+B)
and
Γ ⊢ b : B
Γ ⊢ inr(b) : (A+B)
. (2.7)
Intuitively, this corresponds to describing the morphism JinlK : JAK → JA + BK
indirectly in terms of its image under the Yoneda embedding: for any morphism
JaK : JΓK → JAK, we have an induced morphism Jinl(a)K : JΓK → JA+BK.
The reason for this is analogous to the difference between the tautological
and reduced-words description of a free group. In the tautological free group,
we insert the generators as nullary operations, so that we need multiplication as
a separate rule, which requires quotienting by an equivalence relation to enforce
desired properties of multiplication. But with reduced words, the generator
rules X  Xg and X  Xg−1 incorporate “just enough multiplication” that
we can define multiplication of reduced words, and prove that it is associative
and so on, without needing to pass to a quotient. Similarly, if we used rules
like (2.6), we would need a separate “substitution rule” such as
Γ ⊢ a : A Γ, x : A ⊢ b : B
Γ ⊢ b[a/x] : B[a/x]
to obtain composition in the classifying category, and to then quotient by an
equivalence relation to make composition associative and unital. But if we
instead use rules like (2.7) that incorporate just the right amount of composition,
one can define substitution as on operation on judgments and prove that it is
associative and so on, thereby reducing or eliminating the need to pass to a
13Depending on technical details far beyond our present scope, this implication might be a
theorem about type theory, or it might be just an unproblematic abuse of notation.
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quotient in constructing the classifying category. Type theorists refer to this as
the admissibility of substitution; it is closely related to cut-elimination.
The rules (2.7) are called the introduction rules for the coproduct (they
“introduce” elements of A + B), whereas (2.5) is called the formation rule.
We also have an elimination rule, which expresses the “existence” part of the
categorical universal property of a coproduct:
Γ, x : A ⊢ cA : C Γ, y : B ⊢ cB : C Γ ⊢ s : A+B
Γ ⊢ case(C, cA, cB, s) : C
(2.8)
That is, given morphisms JAK → JCK and JBK → JCK, we have a morphism
JA + BK → JCK. The notation case(C, cA, cB, s) suggests that it is defined by
inspecting the element s of A + B and dividing into cases: if it is of the form
inl(x), then we use cA, whereas if it is of the form inr(y), then we use cB.
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More generally, we allow C to be a dependent type:
Γ, z : A+B ⊢ C type Γ ⊢ s : A+B
Γ, x : A ⊢ cA : C[inl(x)/z] Γ, y : B ⊢ cB : C[inr(y)/z]
Γ ⊢ case(C, cA, cB, s) : C[s/z]
(2.9)
Categorically, this says that given a map JCK → JA + BK and sections of its
pullbacks to JAK and JBK, we can define a section over JA+BK by the universal
property of JA + BK. This generalization of the existence part of the universal
property is actually an equivalent way to include the uniqueness part of it.
On one hand, categorically, uniqueness is what tells us that the induced map
JA + BK → JCK is in fact a section. On the other hand, assuming (2.9), if
z : A+ B ⊢ c : C and z : A+B ⊢ d : C have equal composites with inl and inr,
then we can express this using the the “equality type” from §2.4:
x : A ⊢ eA : c[inl(x)/z] = d[inl(x)/z] y : B ⊢ eB : c[inr(y)/z] = d[inr(y)/z]
and then use (2.9) to construct z : A+B ⊢ e : (c = d).
Finally, the universal property also requires that Jcase(C, cA, cB)K ◦ JinlK
equals JcAK, and similarly for inr. These are called computation rules. We
postpone discussing the exact meaning of “equals” here until §§3.3 and 4.B;
notationally we write it as ≡.
Γ, z : A+B ⊢ C type
Γ, x : A ⊢ cA : C[inl(x)/z] Γ, y : B ⊢ cB : C[inr(y)/z]
Γ ⊢ case(C, cA, cB, inl(a)) ≡ cA[a/x]
In conclusion, we have four groups of rules relating to coproducts: formation
(how to build types), introduction (how to build elements of those types), elim-
ination (how to use elements of those types to build elements of other types),
and computation (how to combine introduction and elimination). Most rules
14Technically, we should really write something like case(C, x.cA, y.cB, s), to indicate which
variables x and y are being used in the terms cA and cB .
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Type constructor Universal property See
coproduct types A+B binary coproducts §2.5
empty type ∅ initial object
product types A×B binary products
unit type 1 terminal object
natural numbers N natural numbers object §4.4
identity type (x = y) diagonal/equalizer §4.1
function type A→ B exponential object (cartesian closure) §2.5
dependent sum
∑
x:AB left adjoint to pullback
dependent product
∏
x:AB right adjoint to pullback (lcc)
proposition type Ω subobject classifier (elementary topos) §2.6
universe type U object classifier (∞-topos) §2.6
coequalizer type coeq(f, g) coequalizer §4.4
Table 1: Type constructors and their semantics
of type theory come in packages like this, associated to one “type constructor”
(here the coproduct) and expressing some universal property. Given any class
of structured categories determined by universal properties, we can obtain a
corresponding type theory by choosing all the corresponding packages of rules.
By and large, the rules for each type constructor are self-contained, allowing
them to be “mixed and matched”; thus unlike ZFC, type theory is not a fixed
system of axioms or rules, but a “modular” framework for such systems.
The most common type constructors and their corresponding universal prop-
erties are shown in Table 1. We will discuss some of these further in later sec-
tions, as indicated. Here we give the rules explicitly only for function types,
which correspond to categorical exponentials; see Figure 1. The exponential
object from A to B is often denoted by BA or AB, but in type theory we denote
it by A → B; this way the notation for its elements is f : A → B, matching
the usual notation for “f is a function from A to B”. Again we have a for-
mation rule saying when A → B is a type, an introduction rule saying how to
produce terms in A→ B, an elimination rule saying how to use such terms (by
applying them to an argument), and two computation rules. Categorically, the
elimination rule yields an “evaluation” morphism JA→ BK× JAK → JBK, while
the introduction rule says that any map JΓK × JAK → JBK has a “transpose”
JΓK → JA→ BK. The computation rules say that these compose correctly.15
An important generalization of this is the dependent function type, where
the codomain B is allowed to depend on the domain A. For instance, the family
of generators of cyclic groups n : N+ ⊢ gn : Cn yields a dependent function,
assigning to each n the generator of Cn:
λn.gn :
∏
n:N+
Cn
Categorically, given Γ ⊢ A type and Γ, x : A ⊢ B type, the type Γ ⊢
∏
n:AB type
15We need two computation rules because we can’t prove the uniqueness part of the universal
property for functions the way we did for coproducts. See also §4.3.
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Γ ⊢ A type Γ ⊢ B type
Γ ⊢ (A→ B) type
Γ, x : A ⊢ b : B
Γ ⊢ λx.M : A→ B
Γ ⊢ f : A→ B Γ ⊢ a : A
Γ ⊢ f(a) : B
Γ, x : A ⊢ b : B Γ ⊢ a : A
Γ ⊢ (λx.b)(a) ≡ b[a/x]
Γ ⊢ f : A→ B
Γ ⊢ f ≡ (λx.f(x))
Figure 1: The rules for function types
is obtained from JΓ, x : A, y : BK → JΓ, x : AK by applying the right adjoint of
pullback along JΓ, x : AK → JΓK. Such a right adjoint exists exactly when the
category is locally cartesian closed (LCC).
Of the type constructors in Table 1, LCC categories also have products A×B,
a terminal object 1, diagonals represented by the identity type (x = y),16 and
left adjoints to pullback represented by dependent sums
∑
x:AB. The latter gen-
eralizes A×B; its elements are pairs (x, y) where the type of y can depend on
x. This collection of type constructors, corresponding to locally cartesian closed
categories, is one of the most “standard” type theories, sometimes called ex-
tensional Martin-Lo¨f Type Theory (EMLTT) without universes (though
that phrase also sometimes includes coproducts and the empty type).
In general, choosing a particular collection of type constructors specifies the
rules for a particular type theory T, and thereby the collection of derivable
judgments. From this we construct a classifying category Ctx(T) as in §2.4,
which one can prove to be initial among categories with the corresponding
structure. For instance, the classifying category of extensional Martin-Lo¨f Type
Theory, as above, is the initial locally cartesian closed category. It follows that
the types and terms we construct in type theory have unique interpretations as
objects and morphisms in any category with appropriate structure, by applying
the unique structure-preserving functor out of the initial object.
As in the case of groups, we often want to generalize this by including “gen-
erators” in addition to operations, allowing us to reason about arbitrary objects
and morphisms that may not necessarily be constructible “from nothing” using
the categorical structure present. And as we did for groups, we can do this by
adding standalone rules to our type theory. For instance, if we add the rules
Γ ⊢ X type Γ ⊢ Y type Γ ⊢ f : X→ Y
(2.10)
to EMLTT, we obtain a type theory whose classifying category is the free locally
cartesian closed category generated by two objects X and Y and a morphism
16When we discuss the identity type in §4.1, we will see that there are multiple choices that
can be made for its rules. For present purposes, the rules include “UIP” (see §4.1).
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Type theory (syntax) Categories (semantics)
classifying category
internal language
A→ B JBKJAK
(x =A y) JAK → JAK × JAK
b[a/x] JbK ◦ JaK
Figure 2: Syntax and semantics
f : X→ Y. (Here X, Y, and f are “constants”, distinct from both variables and
meta-variables.) Thus, given any other locally cartesian closed category C in
which we have chosen two objects A,B and a morphism g : A → B, there is a
unique map from this classifying category sending X, Y, and f to A, B, and g
respectively. Thus, anything constructable in type theory with the additional
rules (2.10) can be interpreted in C and yield a result relative to A, B, and g.
Rules like (2.10) appear to correspond only to free groups, whereas we gen-
erally also consider presented groups, with relations in addition to generators.
However, as we saw in §2.4, equalities can be represented by elements of identity
types; thus here the “presented” case is subsumed by the “free” case.
Constant rules like (2.10) allow us to reason about small collections of data
in arbitrary structured categories. In addition, given a category C , there is a
way to reason about “all of C and nothing else”, by adding a constant for every
object, morphism, and equality in C . This yields a type theory Lang(C ) called
the internal language of C . It is closely related to the “Mitchell–Benabou
language” and “Kripke–Joyal semantics” of a topos [17, 46, 58, 80], which are
type theories of a sort, but unlike ours do not include general dependent types.
If we fix some collection of type constructors, corresponding to a notion of
structured category, then we can define a “category of type theories” based on
these type constructors (with varying choices of constants). Then Ctx becomes
a functor from this category to an appropriate category of structured categories,
and Lang into a right adjoint (or perhaps, depending on how we define the cat-
egory of type theories, an inverse equivalence) to Ctx; see Figure 2. The counit
of this adjunction is a functor Ctx(Lang(C ))→ C that interprets the internal
language of C in C itself; this gives a “complete” syntax for constructions in C ,
analogous to the canonical presentation of a group G involving one generator
for each element and one relation for each equality.
I have just sketched an appealing general picture of the correspondence be-
tween type theories and categories. However, proving the correctness of this
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picture can be exceedingly technical. Seely’s original proposal [100] contained
a subtle technical flaw, later fixed by Hofmann and others [30, 35, 49, 50]. But
even now, complete proofs of the freeness of Ctx(T) are quite involved and hard
to find: they exist for some collections of type constructors [30, 55, 58, 68, 107],
and everyone expects all other cases to be analogous, but at present there is no
general theorem. Indeed, even a precise definition of “any type constructor” is
still lacking in the literature. This is a current research problem, but I expect
it to be solved one day; so I will say no more about this issue, except for a brief
discussion of the (even more difficult) higher-categorical situation in §4.A.
2.6 Subobject classifiers and universes
There is one class of type constructors, called universes, that merits some in-
dividual discussion. The simplest of these is a subobject classifier, which cate-
gorically is a monomorphism T : 1 → Ω of which every other monomorphism
is uniquely a pullback. In the category of sets, Ω = {T,F} is the set of truth
values, and for a subset A ⊆ B we have A = χ−1A (T), where χA : B → Ω is the
characteristic function of A.
If we identify T and F with a 1-element set and a 0-element set respectively,
then up to isomorphism, the characteristic function of A ⊆ B sends each b ∈ B
to its preimage under the inclusion A →֒ B. This leads us to represent Ω by a
type whose elements are themselves types, with a rule like
Γ ⊢ P : Ω
Γ ⊢ P type
(2.11)
In particular, we have x : Ω ⊢ x type; and any other instance of (2.11) can be
obtained from this “universal case” by substitution. Semantically, the interpre-
tation of Γ ⊢ P : Ω is a morphism JP K : JΓK → JΩK, while the interpretation
of Γ ⊢ P type is an object of the slice over JΓK, i.e. a projection morphism
JΓ, x : P K → JΓK. These two morphisms fit into a pullback square:
JΓ, x : P K //

❴
✤
Jx : Ω, y : xK

JΓK
JP K
// JΩK.
Thus, the morphism on the right (the interpretation of x : Ω ⊢ x type) is
the universal monomorphism T : 1 → JΩK for a subobject classifier (and in
particular, Jx : Ω, y : xK is a terminal object).
The fact that any Γ ⊢ P : Ω classifies a monomorphism means equivalently
that the types in Ω (the fibers of the corresponding objects of Ctx/JΓK) should
“have at most one element”. We thus express it by the following rule:
Γ ⊢ P : Ω Γ ⊢ a : P Γ ⊢ b : P
Γ ⊢ trP (a, b) : a = b
(2.12)
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This says that the diagonal JΓ, x : AK → JΓ, x : A, y : AK has a section; hence it
is an isomorphism and so JΓ, x : AK → JΓK is mono. (The notation trP stands
for “truncation”; see §3.1.) The universality of T : 1 → JΩK means that any
type with “at most one element” is equivalent to one in Ω:17
Γ ⊢ P type Γ, x : P, y : P ⊢ p : x = y
Γ ⊢ Rsz(P, xy.p) : Ω
(2.13)
Γ ⊢ P type Γ, x : P, y : P ⊢ p : x = y
Γ ⊢ rszP,xy.p : (Rsz(P, xy.p)→ P )× (P → Rsz(P, xy.p))
(2.14)
The notations Rsz and rsz stand for “resize”, indicating that P may be “too big
to fit inside” Ω, but there is an equivalent type that does.
More generally, we can consider a universe type U , whose elements are types
without any monomorphy restriction.18 That is, we have the analogue of (2.11):
Γ ⊢ P : U
Γ ⊢ P type
but no analogue of (2.12). The direct analogue of (2.13) would yield in particular
Rsz(U ) : U , making the theory inconsistent due to Cantorian-type paradoxes.
Instead we assert that U is closed under the other type constructors, e.g.
Γ ⊢ P : U Γ, x : P ⊢ Q : U
Γ ⊢
∏
x:P Q : U
Γ ⊢ P : U Γ, x : P ⊢ Q : U
Γ ⊢
∑
x:P Q : U
Γ ⊢ P : U Γ ⊢ a : P Γ ⊢ b : P
Γ ⊢ (a = b) : U
Thus U is similar to a set-theoretic “Grothendieck universe” or inaccessible
cardinal. Of course, we can also have many universes Ui of different sizes.
Categorically, subobject classifiers are characteristic of elementary toposes,
while universe objects arise in algebraic set theory [5, 60]. But we will see in
§4 that universes really come into their own when we pass to (∞, 1)-categories
and incorporate Voevodsky’s univalence axiom.
2.7 Toposes of spaces
The preceding general theory tells us that given any category of spaces, if we
choose a collection of type constructor “packages” corresponding to universal
properties that exist in that category, the resulting type theory can be used to
reason “internally” about that category. Turning this around, for each “pack-
age” we want to include in our type theory, there is a corresponding restriction
on the categories of spaces in which we can model it.
17The astute reader may notice that something is missing; we will return to this in §4.
18It is common in type theory to denote U by “Type”, and similarly to denote Ω by “Prop”.
The latter will make more sense in §3.1.
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Starting with the least restrictive case, simple type theory (i.e. no dependent
types) requires only a category with finite products, which includes practically
any category of spaces. Nothing further is required to interpret binary product
types A×B and the unit type 1. To interpret the coproduct type A+B and the
empty type ∅, we need a category with finite products and finite coproducts,
with the former distributing over the latter (this is because the elimination
rule for coproducts can be applied anywhere in a context, so that for instance
Jx : A+B, z : CK also has the universal property of Jx : A, z : CK+Jy : B, z : CK).
To interpret dependent type theory, we require at least finite limits (since
substitution into dependent types is interpreted by pullback). This rules out a
few examples such as smooth manifolds, but these can generally be embedded
into larger categories having limits, such as “generalized smooth spaces” (see for
instance Iglesias-Zemmour’s chapter). Nothing further is required to interpret
the dependent sum type
∑
x:AB and the identity type (x = y).
The function type A → B in simple type theory can be interpreted in any
cartesian closed category, but in dependent type theory it requires a locally
cartesian closed category, since type constructors can be applied in any context
(i.e. in any slice category). Local cartesian closure also allows us to interpret
the dependent function type
∏
x:AB.
Ordinary topological spaces are not cartesian closed, but various slight mod-
ifications of them are. The best-known of these, such as compactly generated
spaces, are not locally cartesian closed, but there are others that are, such as
subsequential spaces [57] (sets with a convergence relation between sequences
and points) or pseudotopological spaces [27, 121] (similar, but using filters in-
stead of sequences). In such categories, a sequence of functions fn : X → Y
converges to f∞ : X → Y in Y X if for any convergent sequence xn  x∞ in
X , the sequence fn(xn) converges to f∞(x∞) in Y ; this is sometimes called
continuous convergence. In fact, subsequential and pseudotopological spaces
both form quasitoposes [122], as do various kinds of generalized smooth spaces
(see [13] and also Iglesias-Zemmour’s chapter on diffeologies).
It is much less clear what sort of “space” could function as a subobject
classifier or a universe. One guess for a subobject classifier that doesn’t work
is the Sierpinski space Σ (the set {T,F} where {T} is open but {F} is not).
Continuous maps X → Σ classify open subspaces of X ; but not every mono is
open. If instead we give the set {T,F} the indiscrete topology, then it classifies
arbitrary subspaces; but the monos of topological spaces (and their relatives)
include all injective continuous functions, which need not be subspace inclusions.
Thus, a subobject classifier Ω has to have sufficient structure that maps into
it can encode chosen topologies on subsets. For instance, if Y → X is mono and
a sequence (xn) lying in Y converges (in X) to a point x∞ also lying in Y , then
it might or might not also converge to x in the topology of Y . Thus, in defining
a map χY : X → Ω classifying Y , even after we know that xn and x∞ are sent
to T (hence lie in Y ), we need an additional degree of freedom in defining χY
to specify whether or not the convergence xn → x∞ is still “present” in Y .
Obviously this is impossible with classical topological spaces, but there are
categories of spaces in which such an object exists: the trick is to make the “spa-
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tial structure” into data rather than a property. For instance, the quasitopos
of subsequential spaces sits inside the topos of consequential spaces. A conse-
quential space is a set equipped with, for every sequence (xn) and point x∞, a
set of “reasons why” or “ways in which” (xn) converges to x∞. (Of course, this
set might be empty, i.e. (xn) might not converge to x∞ at all.) The axioms of
a subsequential space are then promoted to operations on these “witnesses of
convergence”, which then have to satisfy their own axioms. See [57] for details.19
The category of consequential spaces is a topos, so it is locally cartesian
closed and has a subobject classifier. The latter has two points {T,F}, but
many different “witnesses” that the constant sequence at T converges to T, al-
lowing the characteristic function of a mono Y → X to retain information about
the topology of Y . One might think we only need two such witnesses, to record
whether a convergent sequence xn  x∞ in X also converges in Y ; but in fact
we need to record which subsequences of {xn} also converge to x∞ in Y . We
can exactly determine the witnesses of convergence in Ω by its universal prop-
erty: they must be the sub-consequential-spaces of the “universal convergent
sequence” N∞ (the one-point compactification of N). See [57, Corollary 4.2].
The category of consequential spaces also has universe objects U . Roughly
speaking, this means that the collection of all consequential spaces (bounded in
size by some cardinality) can be made into a consequential space. By the desired
universal property of U , a witness that a sequence of spaces (Xn) converges to
X∞ consists of a consistent way to make
(∐
nXn
)
⊔ X∞ into a consequential
space over N∞, which roughly means giving a consistent collection of witnesses
for convergence of sequences xn ∈ Xn to points x∞ ∈ X∞. In [42] it is shown
that for any (Xn) and X∞ there is at least one such witness, so the topology of
U is “indiscrete” in some sense (though unlike for a classical indiscrete space,
interesting information is still carried by how many such witnesses there are).
Generalizing from consequential spaces, for any small collection of spaces T ,
we can build a topos whose objects are “spaces” whose “topology” is determined
by “probing” them with maps out of T . More precisely, we take the category of
sheaves for some Grothendieck topology on T . Consequential spaces are the case
when T = {N∞}, so that a space is determined by its “convergent sequences”.
Another reasonable choice is T = {Rn}n∈N, yielding spaces determined by
a notion of “continuous paths, homotopies, and higher homotopies”.20 Urs
Schreiber has suggested to call these continuous sets. Just as a sequence in a
consequential space can “converge to a point” in more than one way, a path in
a continuous set can “be continuous” in more than one way. By the adjunction,
continuous paths R→ Y X are equivalently homotopies R×X → Y . Similarly,
in U , the witnesses to continuity of a “path of spaces” {Xt}t∈R are the ways to
make
∐
t∈RXt into a space over R, which roughly means a consistent collection
19The term “consequential space” should not be blamed on [57], who considered it but then
discarded it. I have chosen to use it anyway, since I know no other term for such spaces.
20To be precise, we take the full subcategory of spaces T = {Rn}n∈N with the Grothendieck
topology of open covers, whereas consequential spaces are obtained from the one-object full
subcategory {N∞} with the “canonical” Grothendieck topology. This difference in topology
is the actual source of a significant amount of the differences between the two toposes.
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of witnesses for the continuity of “paths” consisting of points xt ∈ Xt for all
t ∈ R. Consequential spaces and continuous sets are similar in many ways, but
different in others, and each has advantages and disadvantages.
If we restrict the morphisms of T to preserve some additional structure on
its objects, we obtain a topos whose objects have a version of that structure.
For instance, if we choose T = {Rn}n∈N but with only the smooth functions
between them, then we obtain a topos whose objects are a kind of generalized
smooth space, in which any given path or homotopy has a set of “witnesses to
smoothness” rather than witnesses to continuity; we call these smooth sets.
Just as the quasitopos of subsequential spaces sits inside the topos of subse-
quential spaces, the quasitopos of diffeological spaces (and hence also the usual
category of smooth manifolds) sits inside the topos of smooth sets.
There are likewise toposes of “algebraic” spaces, as well as toposes containing
“infinitesimal” or “super” spaces; see [13, 88] and Schreiber’s chapter.
2.8 Why Spaces?
We can now address the question mentioned in §1 of why so many objects in
mathematics come naturally with spatial structure. The short answer is that
since type theory can be a language for all of mathematics, any construction of
a mathematical object can be phrased in type theory and then interpreted into
any of these toposes of spaces, thereby yielding not just a set but a space.
However, this answer is missing something important: to say that a set
X comes naturally with spatial structure is to say that we have a canonically
defined space whose underlying set is X , and simply being able to interpret the
construction of X in a topos of spaces doesn’t ensure this. If the “underlying
set” functor from our topos of spaces to the category of sets preserved all the
structure used to interpret type theory (limits, colimits, dependent exponentials,
universes, and so on — this is called a logical functor), then this would follow
from the initiality of the classifying category. Namely, the unique functor from
the classifying category to the category of sets would factor uniquely through our
topos of spaces, implying that the image of X in sets would be the underlying
set of the image of X in spaces, as shown in Figure 3.
In general, the underlying-set functor does not preserve all the structure.
But it does preserve quite a lot of it. In fact, for all the categories of spaces
considered above, the underlying-set functor fits into a string of adjunctions:
topos of spaces
Γ

topos of sets
∆
OO
⊣ ⊣ ∇
OO
where Γ is the underlying-set functor, ∆ equips a set with a “discrete topology”,
and ∇ equips it with an “indiscrete topology”. (In consequential spaces, the
discrete topology says that only eventually-constant sequences converge, while
the indiscrete one says that every sequence converges (uniquely) to every point.)
24
classifying category
JXK
unique spaces
JXKspaces
unique
underlying set
sets
JXKsets
Figure 3: A hypothetical logical underlying-set functor
Moreover, ∆ preserves finite limits, and ∆ and ∇ are fully faithful; this makes
the category of spaces into a local topos over sets (see [56] or [58, §C3.6]).
In particular, this string of adjunctions implies that Γ preserves all limits
and colimits. In the above examples, Γ also preserves the subobject classifier
and the universes — this is clear from our explicit descriptions of these above,
and categorically it implies that the spaces are also a hyperconnected topos.
The main thing that Γ doesn’t preserve is function-spaces. However, it does
preserve function-spaces whose domain is discrete: for any set X and space Y
we have Γ(Y ∆X) ∼= (ΓY )X , and likewise for dependent exponentials. (This
follows formally from the fact that ∆ preserves finite limits.)
The upshot is that any mathematical construction can be interpreted as
a space, and as long as the only functions it uses have a domain that (when
interpreted as a space) is discrete, the resulting space will be a topology on the
set that we originally thought we were defining. This restriction makes sense:
once we start using functions with non-discrete domain, in the world of spaces
we have to consider only continuous functions, causing a divergence from the
world of sets. Moreover, in this case often the world of spaces is the “correct”
one: we should restrict to continuous maps between profinite groups, and use
only continuous homomorphisms in the Pontryagin dual.
The next natural question to ask is, when does a given mathematical con-
struction inherit a non-discrete topology? Categorically, this means asking
which constructions are (not) preserved by ∆. Since ∆ is a left adjoint, it
preserves colimits, and as remarked it preserves finite limits; but in general it
doesn’t preserve much more than this. Thus, nontrivial topologies can arise
from (1) infinite limits, (2) function-spaces (which, in the category of sets, are
just particular infinite products), or (3) the subobject classifier or a universe.
Many constructions that automatically inherit spatial structure are obtained
by infinite limits. For instance, the profinite completion is a limit of finite
quotients. In the topos of consequential spaces, this infinite limit generally has
its expected topology, since “take the convergent sequences” is a limit-preserving
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functor from classical topological spaces to consequential spaces.
By contrast, for the topos of continuous sets (and similarly smooth sets), ∆
does preserve infinite limits, and indeed it has a further left adjoint (see §5).
Thus, the profinite completion in these toposes gets the discrete topology (intu-
itively, profinite topologies are incompatible with the “manifold-like” structure
of a continuous set). More generally, nontrivial continuous-set structures can
arise only in constructions that include the subobject classifier or a universe.
Perhaps the most important example of such a space is the real numbers R; but
before discussing them, we need to talk about logic in type theory.
3 Towards synthetic topology
In §2.1 I claimed that type theory presents a free “universe of mathematics”. So
far, we have seen that type theory contains type constructors such as products,
coproducts, and exponentials that look like the standard operations on sets.
Moreover, when taken literally (rather than as “code” for objects and morphisms
in a category), the syntax of type theory talks about elements of types, and the
rules stipulate that the elements of product types, exponential types, and so on
are exactly what we would expect. Thus, any mathematical construction that is
classically performed with sets, such as building the rational and real numbers
out of the integers, can be performed with types instead.
However, there is more to mathematics than constructing things: we also like
to prove things about them. The formal system of ZFC set theory is formulated
inside of first-order logic, so that proving is the “basic act of mathematics”:
what are called “constructions” are actually just existence (or existence-and-
uniqueness) proofs. But in type theory, constructions are the “basic act of
mathematics”; so what has happened to proofs?
3.1 Propositions as types
In set theory, a property P of elements of a set A can be equivalently expressed
as a subset of A, namely {x ∈ A | P (x)}. Categorically, this is a monomorphism
into A, or equivalently its characteristic function A→ Ω. This provides us with
the means to define logic inside of type theory: we declare that by a property
of elements of a type A we mean a judgment x : A ⊢ P : Ω. Similarly, by
a proposition21 we mean simply an element of Ω: that is, a type having at
most one element. We regard such a proposition as “true” when it does have an
element. That is, the proposition corresponding to P : Ω is “P has an element”.
Similarly, by a proof of P : Ω we mean a construction of an element of P .
We have already seen an example of this way of representing properties: the
equality type x : A, y : A ⊢ (x = y) type, which in §2.4 we said represents the
diagonal △A : JAK → JAK × JAK as an object of Ctx/(JAK × JAK). Since △A is
21We use “proposition” in the logician’s sense of something that one might try to prove,
rather than the other common meaning of something that has been proven. Note that in [111],
types with at most one element are called mere propositions rather than just “propositions”.
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Γ ⊢ A type
Γ ⊢ ‖A‖ : Ω
Γ ⊢ A type Γ ⊢ a : A
Γ ⊢ |a| : ‖A‖
Γ ⊢ A type Γ ⊢ B : Ω Γ, x : A ⊢ b : B Γ ⊢ a : ‖A‖
Γ ⊢ ptr(x.b, a) : B
Γ ⊢ A type Γ ⊢ B : Ω Γ, x : A ⊢ b : B Γ ⊢ a : A
Γ ⊢ ptr(x.b, |a|) ≡ b[a/x]
Figure 4: Propositional truncation
a monomorphism, it is classified by a map JAK × JAK → Ω, which is the binary
relation of equality. In the category of sets, this map sends (x, x) to T, since
the fiber of △A over (x, x) has one element, and sends (x, y) to F if x 6= y, since
then the fiber of △A over (x, y) is empty. (But see §4.)
This identification of propositions with “types having at most one element”
is close to, but not quite, the usual meaning of the phrase propositions as types.
The latter refers to allowing any type to be called a proposition, rather than
only those with at most one element. However, our choice (which is increas-
ingly common) relates better to the standard practice in mathematics whereby
once a proposition has been proven, the particular proof given has no further
mathematical (as opposed to aesthetic or conceptual) importance.
One reason the identification of propositions with (certain) types is so con-
venient is an observation called the Curry–Howard correspondence [36, 52, 83,
119]: the operations of logic are already present in type theory as constructions
on types. For instance, if P and Q are propositions, then so is P ×Q; and since
it has an element just when P and Q do, it is natural to call it “P and Q”.
Similarly, P → Q is “if P then Q”, since a function f : P → Q transforms the
truth of P into the truth of Q, while
∏
x:A P (x) is “for all x : A, P (x)”, since
a dependent function f :
∏
x:A P (x) assigns to any x : A a proof of P (x). It is
also reasonable to regard P → ∅ as “not P”, since a function f : P → ∅ can
only exist if P is empty (i.e. false).
We might expect P +Q to be “P or Q”, but P +Q may not be a proposition
even if P and Q are. For this purpose we introduce a new type constructor
called the propositional truncation22, whose rules are shown in Figure 4. (The
notation ptr just stands for “propositional truncation”.) Intuitively, ‖A‖ is the
proposition “A has at least one element”; while categorically, Γ ⊢ ‖A‖ : Ω
presents the image of the projection JΓ, x : AK → JΓK. The introduction rule
says that if we have an element of A, then A has at least one element. The
elimination rule says that if we know that A has at least one element, then
when proving a proposition we may assume given an element of A. (Removing
22Propositional truncation has a long history and many variations, with names such as
squash type, mono-type, and bracket type; see e.g. [11, 32, 81, 86, 111].
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the hypothesis that B is a proposition would imply a choice principle that is
too strong even for classical mathematics; see footnote 34 on page 44.)
Now we define “P or Q” to be ‖P +Q‖, and similarly “there exists an x : A
such that P (x)” to be ‖
∑
x:A P (x)‖. As observed by Lawvere [72], this def-
inition of the existential quantifier can be described categorically as the left
adjoint to pullback between posets of subobjects Sub(JΓK) → Sub(JΓ, x : AK).
The untruncated
∑
x:A gives the left adjoint to the pullback between slice cat-
egories Ctx/JΓK → Ctx/JΓ, x : AK, and the truncation reflects it back into
monomorphisms. Similarly, the universal quantifier “for all x : A, P (x)” is the
right adjoint of the same functor: since the right adjoint
∏
x:A between slice
categories already preserves monomorphisms, no truncation is necessary.
Rather than being the existential quantifier, the untruncated
∑
x:A P (x)
plays the role of the subset {x ∈ A | P (x)}. Its elements are pairs of an element
x : A and a proof that P (x) holds, and since P (x) is a proposition, to give an
element of P (x) contains no more information than that P (x) “is true”. Thus
we may consider the elements of
∑
x:A P (x) to be “the elements of A such that
P (x) is true”. The type of all subsets of A, mentioned in §2.4, is just “A→ Ω”.
In conclusion, instead of describing mathematics inside of logic, as is done
by ZFC set theory, in type theory we “define logic inside of mathematics”. One
advantage of this is that, as we have seen, type theory can be interpreted in
suitably structured categories, yielding an intrinsic “logic” internal to any such
category. Another is that it allows us to draw finer distinctions, thereby actually
representing informal mathematics more faithfully, in the following way.
We mentioned above that there is a tradition in type theory that interprets
“there exists an x : A such that P (x)” as
∑
x:A P (x) rather than ‖
∑
x:A P (x)‖.
In addition to its mismatch with the standard practice of mathematics, when
done indiscriminately this can actually lead to inconsistencies; see [111, §3.2]
and [41]. However, there are places in ordinary mathematics where a “there
exists” statement is more naturally interpreted as
∑
x:A P (x). For instance, the
Yoneda lemma Nat(C (−, a), F ) ∼= F (a) doesn’t mean that there merely exists
such an isomorphism but that we have specified a particular one. ZFC set
theory, being formulated inside first-order logic, forces every “theorem” to be
a “mere existence” statement; but type theory frees us from this straitjacket,
allowing us to directly express “constructions” in addition to “proofs”.
3.2 Constructive logic
When the logical connectives are defined according to the Curry–Howard corre-
spondence, most of the basic laws of logic can be derived from the rules for the
basic type constructors. For instance, one of de Morgan’s laws
(¬P ∧ ¬Q)→ ¬(P ∨Q)
(where as usual ∧,∨,¬ mean “and”, “or”, and “not”) has the following proof:
λx.λy.ptr(case(∅, pr1(x)(y), pr2(x)(y), y), y) : (¬P ∧ ¬Q)→ ¬(P ∨Q).
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(Of course, it would be a heavy burden to carry around such long terms
whenever we want to use de Morgan’s law. But writing out a fully formalized
proof in ZFC is no easier — in fact, often it is much harder! In both cases the
formalism simply justifies our ordinary mode of mathematical writing.)
However, we cannot derive from the rules of type theory any proofs of the
following classical tautologies of logic:
¬(P ∧Q)→ (¬P ∨¬Q) ¬¬P → P P ∨¬P (¬∀x, P (x)) → (∃x,¬P (x))
In other words, the logic we obtain from propositions-as-types is constructive or
intuitionistic logic. Constructive logic acquired a bad name due to some funda-
mentalists in the early 20th century, but in fact it is natural and unavoidable
once we recognize that type theory is a syntax for categories, and that sets are
not the only category in the world (see [15]). The above tautologies are simply
not true in most categories of spaces.
For example, consider the proposition
∏
x:A P (x)∨¬P (x), where A is a type
and P : A → Ω a property, and let us interpret this in a “topological” topos
such as those discussed in §2.7. Now P classifies a monomorphism B ֌ A,
which as mentioned previously need not be a subspace embedding. Similarly,
¬P classifies a different monomorphism ¬B ֌ A, which turns out to be the
“maximal mono disjoint from B”. In other words, ¬B contains all the points of
A that are absent from B, and also “all the topology” on those points that is
absent from B (e.g. all the convergent sequences, or all the continuous paths).
However, (λx.P (x)∨¬P (x)) : A→ Ω classifies their union B∪¬B as monos into
A, which is not generally a subspace even if B is: it contains all the points of A,
but its topology is that of the disjoint union B⊔¬B. Thus the monoB⊔¬B → A
has no continuous section, and so we cannot assert
∏
x:A P (x) ∨ ¬P (x).
In other words, constructive logic is simply more general than classical logic.
As always, using fewer assumptions — here, assumptions about logic — leads
to a more general conclusion — here, one that applies to more categories.
There is also another sense in which constructive logic is more general:
classical logic can be embedded in constructive logic. Specifically, the subset
Ω¬¬ of Ω consisting of those P such that ¬¬P → P (formally, the Σ-type∑
P :Ω(¬¬P → P )) admits logical operations satisfying the laws of classical
logic. In fact, Ω¬¬ is closed under all the ordinary logical operations except for
“or” and “there exists”, and we can define P ∨′ Q to be ¬¬(P ∨Q) and ∃′x : A
to be ¬¬∃x : A. (Note the similarity to how in §3.1 we applied ‖−‖ to + and∑
to get ∨ and ∃.) In categories of spaces, the subtypes whose classifying map
factors through Ω¬¬ generally coincide with the subspace embeddings.
Using Ω¬¬ gives us a different “logic” that is always classical, but is not
as well-behaved in other ways. For instance, it fails to satisfy function com-
prehension (a.k.a. the principle of unique choice): “if for all x : A there is a
unique y : B such that P (x, y), then there is f : A → B such that P (x, f(x))
for all x : A.” However, there is a subuniverse of types where Ω¬¬-logic does
behave well. Define a type A to be a ¬¬-sheaf if the “constant functions” map
(λx.λp.x) : A→ (P → A) is an isomorphism for any P : Ω such that ¬¬P . The
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world of ¬¬-sheaves in constructive mathematics behaves just like the world of
classical mathematics, with both classical logic and function comprehension. In
categories of spaces, the ¬¬-sheaves are generally the indiscrete spaces. (If you
were expecting to hear “discrete” instead of “indiscrete”, wait for §5.3.)
On the other hand, it is always possible to add classical logic globally to type
theory as a rule:
Γ ⊢ P : Ω
Γ ⊢ lem(P ) : P ∨ ¬P
(This rule, called the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM), suffices to prove all the
other classical tautologies.) This would mean restricting our syntax to apply
only to “Boolean” categories, such as sets, and excluding most topological ones,
just as adding the relations gh = hg to a free group turns it into a free abelian
group, with a more restricted universal property. Similarly, we can add a type-
theoretic version of the Axiom of Choice (AC), which is not provable23 even
after adding LEM, and whose precise formulation we leave to the reader.24
If we wanted only to use type theory merely as a foundation for classical
mathematics, there would be no problem with this.25 But in this chapter our
focus is on type theory as a syntax for categories of spaces, which frequently
means that we must learn to live with constructive logic (though we will see in
§4 that “homotopy spaces” can be compatible with classical logic). Fortunately,
this is usually not very difficult; often it suffices to rephrase things carefully,
avoiding unnecessary negations. For instance, constructively it is not very useful
to say that a type is nonempty (¬(A ∼= ∅) or equivalently ¬¬A); instead we
use the positive statement that it is “inhabited” (∃x : A, i.e. ‖A‖). It also
often happens that a group of classically equivalent definitions are no longer
the same constructively, and we have to judiciously choose the “correct” one.
For instance, classically a set is finite just when it is not bijective to any proper
subset of itself, but constructively this is a weaker and less useful condition; the
correct definition of “finite” is “bijective to {k : N | k < n} for some n : N”.
Once we get over this minor hurdle, we can develop mathematics on top of
type theory in basically the same way as usual. Formally, type-theoretic proofs
and constructions involve heavy manipulation of syntax (just as in any other
formal foundational system like ZFC); but as mentioned above, when actually
doing mathematics there is usually no reason to bother about this.
23The reader may have heard rumors that the axiom of choice is actually provable in type
theory without any added axioms. It is true that one can prove a statement that looks like
the axiom of choice if arbitrary types are allowed to play the role of “propositions”, i.e. if all
propositional truncations are removed from the definitions of the logical operations in §3.1.
But from our perspective, this provable statement is not at all the axiom of choice, since its
hypothesis already essentially carries along the data of a choice function.
24There is also a subuniverse like the ¬¬-sheaves that satisfies AC as well as LEM: one can
build Go¨del’s “constructible universe” L (no relation to “constructive logic”) inside the ¬¬-
sheaves. However, this relies on first-order logic and ZFC-style membership-based set theory;
no category-theoretic or type-theoretic construction of such a subuniverse is known.
25There are many toposes, other than the category of sets, that satisfy both LEM and AC.
They are roughly the same as forcing models of ZFC. However, none of them are “spatial” in
the sense we care about here.
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As a simple example, once we have the natural numbers type N, we can define
the integers Z as N+N (with appropriate structure), the rational numbers Q as
a subtype of Z×N (the “fractions a/b in lowest terms”), and the real numbers R
as a subtype of (Q→ Ω)× (Q→ Ω) (the two-sided Dedekind cuts). Recall that
by a “subtype of A” we mean a type of the form
∑
x:A P (x) where P : A→ Ω
is a property; for instance, more formally we have
Q =
∑
r:Z×N
(
pr2(r) > 0 ∧
∏
n:N
(
(n | pr1(r)) ∧ (n | pr2(r))→ n = 1
))
.
Here pr1 and pr2 are the projections out of a cartesian product, and > and | are
relations that we have to define previously, e.g.
(n | m) =
(
∃p : N, (p · n = m)
)
=
∥∥∥∑p:N(p · n = m)∥∥∥
where multiplication has been previously defined, etc. We can then proceed to
define all the usual functions and properties of numbers of all sorts, and build
the rest of mathematics on top of them.
When this syntax is interpreted into the category of sets, it of course yields
the usual sets of numbers. The point, however, is that if we instead interpret it
into a category of spaces, the types of numbers automatically inherit a spatial
structure, and usually that spatial structure is the intended one! For instance,
in the toposes of consequential spaces or continuous sets from §2.7, the real
numbers type R is interpreted by the real numbers with their usual Euclidean
topology (see [57, Proposition 4.4] and [80, Theorem VI.9.2]).
Note that the definition of R using Dedekind cuts (which we may denote Rd
for emphasis) fulfills the requirement for a nontrivial continuous-set structure,
since it uses Ω. However, not all the classically-equivalent definitions of R remain
equivalent constructively. For instance, the Cauchy reals Rc, defined by taking
equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences, come with an inclusion Rc → Rd that
is not generally surjective. In consequential spaces, we have Rc ∼= Rd; but in
continuous sets, Rc gets the discrete topology. Thus, it is usually better to
regard the Dedekind real numbers as “the” real numbers.
Since the Dedekind reals R have their usual topology in our toposes, other
types built from them, such as the circle S1 =
{
(x, y) : R× R | x2 + y2 = 1
}
,
the complex numbers C ∼= R × R, or matrix groups GLn(R) ⊆ Rn
2
, also have
their usual topologies. Furthermore, all functions definable in type theory are
interpreted by continuous maps; so the fact that we can define addition of real
numbers in type theory tells us automatically that R is a topological group,
and so on. Analogous facts are true for the other constructions leading to
nontrivial topologies mentioned in §2.8, such as profinite completion. Thus,
we have finally made good on our promise from §1 to provide a formal system
for describing “groups with background spatial structure” that is sufficiently
flexible to include all different kinds of spatial structure at once, with the added
benefit of a uniform way of constructing the standard examples.
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The fact that “the real numbers” defined in type theory are interpreted in
some categories by the usual space of real numbers has an interesting conse-
quence: constructively, we cannot define26 any discontinuous function R → R.
In particular, the usual examples of discontinuous “piecewise” functions R→ R,
such as the Heaviside step function
f(x) =
{
0 if x < 0
1 if x ≥ 0
cannot be defined constructively — or, more precisely, their domain cannot be
shown constructively to be all of R (that being tantamount to the assertion that
every real number is either < 0 or ≥ 0, which is essentially an instance of LEM).
That is, restricting ourselves to constructive logic automatically “notices”, and
forces us to respect, a canonical and implicit topological structure on types such
as R. In the next section we briefly discuss another such implicit structure.
3.3 A digression on computation
While our primary concern here is with the suitability of type theory as a “logic
of space”, historically it developed rather differently. The first type theory,
which bore little resemblance to its modern descendants, was introduced by
Russell to avoid his eponymous paradox. After other logicians such as Go¨del
refined Russell’s type theory in various ways, Church [28, 29] combined it with
his “λ-calculus” to obtain what today we can see as a typed functional program-
ming language. The dependent type theory we are using here is mainly due to
Martin-Lo¨f [83, 84], whose intent was to give “a full scale system for formalizing
intuitionistic mathematics” in the sense of Bishop [19, 20]. Bishop, in turn,
wanted to develop a form of mathematics in which all statements would have
computational meaning, so that for instance whenever we assert something to
exist we must have a method for finding it. This led him, following the ear-
lier pioneering work of Brouwer, to reject the law of excluded middle, since in
general there can be no method for deciding which of P or ¬P holds.
Thus, type theory was originally conceived as a formal basis for a mathemat-
ics that would be “constructive” in this computational sense. It is remarkable
that it turned out to also be a flexible system for reasoning in arbitrary cat-
egories! The existence of internal languages of categories was apparently first
recognized for elementary toposes [21, 67, 87]; the “Mitchell–Benabou language”
of a topos is a sort of type theory in which the only dependent types are those
in Ω. The generalization to Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory was first written down by
Seely [100], and corrected and refined by others as discussed in §2.5.
From our category-theoretic point of view, the computational aspect of type
theory is partly explained by a different class of models. In addition to categories
of “spaces” where every map is continuous, there are categories of “computable
objects” [53, 114] in which every map is computable. Thus, everything in type
26To be precise, we cannot define such a function “in the empty context”, i.e. without any
ambient assumptions.
32
theory must be “potentially computable” in addition to “potentially continu-
ous”. In particular, just as any constructively definable function R→ R must be
continuous, any constructively definable function N→ N must be computable.
However, there is more to the computational side of type theory than this:
its syntax is actually a programming language that can be executed. That is,
not only does every term f : N → N represent a computable function, but its
definition is an algorithm for computing that function. The “execution” of such
a program is essentially the type-theoretic version of the “reduction” algorithm
for free groups that simplifies (g((hg)−1((hh)g−1)))h−1 to hg−1h−1.
Specifically, these reductions implement the “computation rules” mentioned
in §2.5 (hence the name). For instance, the first computation rule in Figure 1 can
be interpreted as a “reduction” or “normalization” step allowing us to “simplify”
(λx.M)(N) toM [N/x]. (This partially explains why we used a different equality
symbol ≡; see also §4.B.) In good cases, these reduction steps are guaranteed to
terminate at a unique “value” or “normal form”, analogous to the reduced words
for elements of a free group. Reduction in a free group is a fairly simple process,
but since type theory is complicated enough to encode all of mathematics, its
notion of “reduction” can serve as a general-purpose programming language.27
This makes type theory a convenient language for reasoning about computer
programs, and as such it has many adherents in computer science. Moreover, we
can implement a “compiler” for type theory on a physical computer, which then
also serves as a proof checker for mathematical arguments. Thus, mathematics
done in type theory not only can be interpreted in many categories, but can
have its correctness formally verified in this way. Such computerized “proof
assistants” built on type theory play an increasingly important role in computer
science, and are slowly growing in importance in mathematics.
One thing to note is that the computational interpretation of type theory is
rather “fragile”: the guarantee of unique termination (called “strong normaliza-
tion” or “canonicity”) depends on the details and interactions of all the rules.
New axioms can cause computation to get “stuck” and never reach a value, while
new computation rules can cause the reduction algorithm to loop or diverge. In
particular, LEM and AC cause computation to stick (and semantically, they
also rule out computational models along with topological ones). This is not
surprising since they assert that certain things exist or are true without giving
any way to construct them. However, none of this prevents us from using com-
puter proof assistants to check proofs involving such noncomputational axioms;
it only means that such proofs can’t then be “executed”.
Since this book is about space rather than computation, I will not say much
more about the computational side of type theory. However, it is worth point-
ing out that computation and topology are actually closely related. As first
recognized by Scott [97–99], computational objects often come naturally with,
or are represented by, topologies representing the fact that a finite computation
can only consume a finite amount of data. In fact, Brouwer’s original intu-
27This programming language is not technically “Turing-complete”, since all its “programs”
must terminate; otherwise we could prove a contradiction with a divergent computation. But
it can still encode all computable functions, e.g. with a partiality monad [24, 37].
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itionism was also arguably more “topological” than computational. For further
discussion of these ideas, see for instance [39, 115].
3.4 Synthetic topology
So far we have seen that the types in type theory admit interpretations as
various different kinds of space. Thus, one might say that they have latent or
potential spatial structure: they might be spaces, but they also might not have
any nontrivial spatiality, depending on where we interpret them. Moreover, they
also have other latent structures, such as computability.
Until now we have considered mainly the aspects of types that are indepen-
dent of their potential spatial structure, where the topology simply comes along
for the ride. However, some spatial aspects of types are visible inside of type
theory, without needing to interpret them first in some category. This leads to
subjects called synthetic topology and synthetic differential geometry.
One important observation is that in many cases we can detect topology
using structures that already exist in type theory. For instance, following [42],
define N∞ to be the type of non-increasing binary sequences:
N∞ =
∑
a:N→2
∏
n:N(an+1 ≤ an)
where 2 is the “Boolean” type with two elements 0 and 1. Then we have an
injection i : N → N∞ where i(m)n = 1 if m < n and 0 otherwise, and we also
have an element “∞ : N∞” defined by ∞n = 1 for all n. In the topos of conse-
quential spaces, N∞ is interpreted by the “actual” one-point compactification of
N; thus it is sensible to define a convergent sequence in a type A to be a map
N∞ → A. In this way, without assuming any axioms, we see that every type
automatically has a structure like a consequential space, and every function is
automatically “continuous” in the sense of preserving convergent sequences.
Of course, the actual interpretation of N∞ depends on the category: in the
topos of continuous sets, it yields N ⊔ {∞} with the discrete topology, so that
every sequence “converges” uniquely to every point. However, the structure of
continuous sets is detectable internally in a different way: define a continuous
path in a type A to be a map R→ A out of the (Dedekind) real numbers. This
gives the expected answer for both consequential spaces and continuous sets,
since in both cases R has its usual topology. We will come back to this in §5.
These internally defined “topologies” are only “potentially nontrivial”: e.g.
if we assume LEM, then every sequence converges uniquely to every point and
every path is uniquely continuous. If we want to ensure that they definitely are
nontrivial, we can assert “nonclassical axioms” that contradict LEM, excluding
the category of sets but retaining topological models. For instance, we could
assert that the only “convergent sequences” in R are those that converge in the
ǫ-N sense, or that every “continuous path” in R is continuous in the ǫ-δ sense.28
28The latter statement is sometimes known as Brouwer’s theorem, since Brouwer proved it
in his “intuitionistic” mathematics using principles derived from “choice sequences”. It is not
a theorem of pure constructive mathematics, which unlike Brouwer’s “intuitionism” is fully
compatible with classical principles like excluded middle, though it does not assume them.
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Convergent sequences and continuous paths are “covariant” notions of topol-
ogy, i.e. they are defined using maps into a type. We can also describe “con-
travariant” notions of topology synthetically, involving maps out of a type. For
instance, with continuous sets in mind, we can define open subsets as the preim-
ages of open intervals under functions A → R. Alternatively, we can construct
or postulate a subtype Σ ⊆ Ω behaving like the Sierpinski space (usually called a
dominance), and define an open subset to be one whose classifying map A→ Ω
factors through Σ. In a topos of sheaves on a category T of spaces, there is an
obvious choice of such a Σ, namely the sheaf represented by the actual Sierpinski
space (whether or not it is in T ). On the other hand, if we want to construct a
particular Σ inside type theory, one possibility is the Rosolini dominance [94]:
ΣRos =
(∑
P :Ω ∃f : N→ 2,
(
P ∼= ∃n : N, (f(n) = 1)
))
That is, ΣRos is the type of propositions of the form ∃n : N, (f(n) = 1) for some
f : N→ 2. In consequential spaces, ΣRos is the Sierpinski space, so the resulting
“open subsets” are as we would expect. (But in continuous sets, ΣRos ∼= 2, so the
only “open subsets” in this sense are unions of connected components.) However
we choose Σ, once chosen we can develop much of classical point-set topology
with these “synthetic open sets”, including compactness, Hausdorffness, and so
on. See [16, 39, 40, 110] for more examples of this sort of “synthetic topology”.
There are also other ways to define open sets synthetically; for instance, [90]
defines U ⊆ A to be open if ∀x : A, ∀y : A, (x ∈ U → (y ∈ U ∨ x 6= y)).
It is more subtle to obtain a synthetic theory of smoothness, since smoothness
does not arise automatically from constructive logic the way that continuity and
computation do. Indeed, it is easy to define non-differentiable functions R→ R
in constructive mathematics, such as the absolute value. Semantically, the type
Rd of Dedekind reals interpreted in the topos of smooth sets actually yields
the sheaf of continuous (not necessarily smooth) real-valued functions on the
domain spaces.29
Clearly a more interesting smooth set than this is the sheaf of smooth real-
valued functions, which is equivalently the usual smooth manifold R regarded
as a diffeological space. In the internal language of smooth sets, this appears
as a type Rs of “smooth reals” living strictly in between the “discrete (Cauchy)
reals” Rc and the “continuous (Dedekind) reals” Rd. It seems unlikely that
there is any type definable in type theory whose interpretation in smooth sets
is Rs, but we can at least write down some axioms that Rs satisfies, such as
being a subring of Rd, or more generally closed under the action of all “standard
smooth functions” (see [44] for one way to make this precise).
A more transformative approach is to make the notion of “smoothness” syn-
thetic as well, rather than relying on the classical limit definition of derivative.
Following Grothendieck’s insight into the importance of nilpotent elements in
algebraic geometry, we can enhance the category T = {Rn}n∈N by replacing
29In particular, while it is true in a sense that “everything is smooth” in this topos, what
this actually means is that each object comes with a “notion of smoothness”, which could in
some cases happen to coincide with mere continuity.
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each Rn by its algebra of smooth functions C∞(Rn) and turning the arrows
around to obtain a category of R-algebras, then adding new algebras that are
“deformations” of some C∞(Rn) containing nilpotents. Whatever the details,
the resulting topos will contain an internal ring R that enhances Rs to include
nilpotent “infinitesimals”, with Rs the quotient by these:
R

Rc // Rs // Rd.
Nilpotents allow a synthetic definition of differentiation: if D ⊆ R is defined by
D = {d : R | d2 = 0}, then for any f : D → R there is a unique f ′(0) : R such
that f(d) = f(0) + f ′(0) · d for all d : D. (This is sometimes called the Kock–
Lawvere axiom.) In particular, all functions f : R→ R are differentiable in this
synthetic sense. The theory resulting from this and similar axioms that hold
in the above sheaf toposes is called synthetic differential geometry; for further
reading see [18, 65, 69, 88] and Kock’s chapter herein.
This section has been a very brief sketch of some ways to access the spatial
structure of types internally. Rather than pursue any of these avenues in detail,
I want to describe (in §5) a newer approach to synthetic topology that leverages
more of the categorical and type-theoretic structure, involving higher modal op-
erators. However, first we must move sideways to consider another very different
latent structure in type theory: that of homotopy spaces or ∞-groupoids.
4 Homotopy type theory
4.1 The mystery of identity types
For many years, the most mysterious part of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory was the
identity types “x = y”. As mentioned in §§2.4 and 3.1, the semantic idea is
that the dependent type x : A, y : A ⊢ (x = y) type represents the diagonal
△A : JAK → JAK × JAK, regarded as an object of Ctx/(JAK × JAK). Of course,
△A is automatically present in the classifying category, as defined in §2.4; but
without the identity type it isn’t represented by any dependent type.
The rules of the identity type are difficult to understand at first, but essen-
tially they use a universal property to express the fact that it is the diagonal.
In fact, any object f : B → A of a slice category C /A has a universal property:
it is the image of the terminal object 1B : B → B of C /B under the left adjoint
f! : C /B → C /A to pullback along f . In other words, for any object g : C → A
of C /A, morphisms f → g in C /A are in natural bijection with sections of the
pullback f∗(g) : f∗C → B:
f∗C

//
❴
✤
C
g

B
f //
FF
A
⇐⇒
B
f ✺
✺✺
✺✺
✺
// C
g
✠✠
✠✠
✠✠
A
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Thus, △A : A → A × A is characterized in C /(A × A) by saying that for
g : C → A×A, morphisms △A → g are naturally bijective to sections of △∗A(g):
△∗AC

//
❴
✤
C
g

A
△A //
GG
A×A
⇐⇒
A
△A ❂
❂❂
❂❂
❂❂
// C
g
    
  
  
 
A×A
If we represent g by a dependent type x : A, y : A ⊢ C type, then the pullback
on the left corresponds to substitution of the same variable for both x and
y, e.g. C[w/x,w/y] in context w : A. The section on the left is then a term
w : A ⊢ c : C[w/x,w/y]; whereas the induced map on the right corresponds to
a term x : A, y : A, p : x = y ⊢ d : C. If we represent the latter in Yoneda form,
as we did for (2.8), we obtain the following rule:
Γ, x : A, y : A ⊢ C type Γ, w : A ⊢ c : C[w/x,w/y]
Γ ⊢ a : A Γ ⊢ b : A Γ ⊢ p : a = b
Γ ⊢ J(C, c, p) : C[a/x, b/y]
(4.1)
The corresponding introduction rule is just the unit of this adjunction, saying
that the diagonal of A has a specified section when pulled back along itself.
Logically, it expresses the reflexivity of equality:
Γ ⊢ A type Γ ⊢ a : A
Γ ⊢ refla : a = a
In the classifying category, this rule is a section as on the left below:
△∗AIdA

//
❴
✤
IdA

JAK
△A //
GG
JAK × JAK
⇐⇒
JAK
△A ""❉
❉❉
❉❉
❉❉
❉
refl // IdA
}}③③
③③
③③
③③
JAK × JAK
where Id denotes Jx : A, y : A, p : x = yK. Thus, refl gives a morphism as on the
right above; the universal property should make this an isomorphism JAK ∼= IdA.
This adjoint characterization of equality is due to Lawvere [70], but it is
closely related to Leibniz’s “indiscernibility of identicals”. Specifically, given a
property x : A ⊢ P (x) : Ω, we can form x : A, y : A ⊢ (P (x) → P (y)) : Ω.
Taking this as C, we have the second hypothesis of (4.1) given by w : A ⊢
(λp.p) : P (w)→ P (w). Thus, from (4.1) we get
x : A, y : A, p : x = y ⊢ J(· · · ) : P (x)→ P (y).
This says that if x and y are equal (“identical”) then any property that holds
of x also holds of y (“indiscernible”). The function P (x) → P (y) induced by p
is often denoted p∗ and called substitution or transport.
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Γ ⊢ A type Γ ⊢ a : A Γ ⊢ b : A
Γ ⊢ (a = b) type
Γ ⊢ A type Γ ⊢ a : A
Γ ⊢ refla : a = a
Γ, x : A, y : A, e : x = y ⊢ C type
Γ, w : A ⊢ c : C[w/x,w/y, reflw/e] Γ ⊢ a : A Γ ⊢ b : A Γ ⊢ p : a = b
Γ ⊢ J(C, c, p) : C[a/x, b/y, p/e]
Γ, x : A, y : A, e : x = y ⊢ C type
Γ, x : A ⊢ c : C[x/y, reflx/e] Γ ⊢ a : A
Γ ⊢ J(C, c, refla) ≡ c[a/x]
Figure 5: The rules for identity types
In dependent type theory, we need to enhance (4.1) to allow C to depend
on a “witness of equality” p : x = y as well, and also add a computation rule
relating it to the introduction rule refla. This yields the rules shown in Figure 5,
which are due to Martin-Lo¨f [83, 84]. Just as for coproducts, we expect this
enhancement to ensure the full universal property of the desired adjunction.
When phrased informally in terms of points, the stronger elimination rule says
that if we want to perform a construction or proof involving a general element
p : x = y (for general x and y), it suffices to consider the case when y is x and p
is reflx. This is formally analogous to the elimination rule for (say) coproducts,
which says that to perform a construction or proof involving a general element
z : A+B, it suffices to consider the two cases when z is inl(x) and inl(y).
It may seem odd to introduce a new notation and system of rules for an
object (the identity type) that turns out to be isomorphic to something we
already had (the diagonal map). The point is that dependent type theory has
two different ways of representing a morphism A → B, depending on whether
we view it as simply a morphism between two objects or as an object of the
slice category over its codomain B. The same is true in set theory: we can
have a function f : A→ B between sets, or we can have a B-indexed family of
sets {Ab}b∈B, and up to isomorphism the two are equivalent by A =
∐
b Ab and
Ab = {a ∈ A | f(a) = b}. As mentioned in §2.4, enabling us to think in terms
of “indexed families” in an arbitrary category is actually one of the strengths
of dependent type theory, and the identity type and Σ-type are exactly what
supply the isomorphism between functions and families in type theory.
However, although the rules in Figure 5 are well-motivated categorically from
a universal property, they appear to have a serious problem. Specifically, if the
identity type satisfies these rules only, and we define the classifying category as
in §2.4, then it does not have pullbacks!
Consider, for instance, how we might try to pull back a dependent type
Jy : B, z : C(y)K → JBK along a morphism JfK : JAK → JBK. In §2.4 we claimed
that such a pullback should be obtained by substituting f(x) for y in C(y). To
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check the universal property, we would consider a diagram as below:
JT K
g
((
h
''
?
''
Jx : A, z : C(f(x))K //

❴
✤
Jy : B, z : C(y)K

JAK
JfK
// JBK.
Then g is a term t : T ⊢ g(t) : A, while h is determined by two terms t : T ⊢
h1(x) : B and t : T ⊢ h2(t) : C(h1(x)). Now it seems as though the commuta-
tivity of the square would force h1(t) to be f(g(t)), so that h2 would be a term
t : T ⊢ h2(t) : C[f(g(t))/y], or equivalently t : T ⊢ h2(t) : C[f(x)/y][g(t)/x],
inducing the dotted morphism.
This appealing argument stumbles on the fact that we quotiented the mor-
phisms in Ctx by an equivalence relation induced by the identity type. Thus, to
say that the above square commutes doesn’t mean that h1(t) is literally f(g(t)),
only that we have a term t : T ⊢ p : h1(t) = f(g(t)). This is not by itself the end
of the world, because p induces a transport function p∗ : C(h1(t))→ C(f(g(t))),
so we can define the dotted morphism as t : T ⊢ p∗(h2(t)) : C(f(g(t))). The
real problem is that this morphism depends on the choice of the term p, but the
term p is not specified by the mere fact that the outer square commutes; thus
the dotted factorization is not unique.
I have stated this problem in a form that may make its solution seem obvious
to a modern reader with a certain background. However, for many years after
Martin-Lo¨f no one with this background looked at the problem; nor was it stated
in this way. Instead the question was whether we can prove inside type theory
that the identity type x : B, y : B ⊢ (x = y) type is a “proposition” in the sense
of §§2.6 and 3.1, i.e. any two of its elements are equal. Categorically, this would
mean proving that the projection Jx : B, y : B, p : x = yK → Jx : B, y : BK is
a monomorphism (as we expect, if it is to be the diagonal); while syntactically
it would mean constructing, given p : x = y and q : x = y, a term of p = q. If
this were the case, different choices of p would result in terms p∗(h2(t)) that are
equal, so that uniqueness for the pullback would be restored.
It turns out, however, that we cannot prove that the identity type is always
a proposition. Thus, people (starting with Martin-Lo¨f) considered adding this
statement as an extra standalone axiom:
Γ ⊢ p : a = b Γ ⊢ q : a = b
Γ ⊢ e : p = q
(4.2)
called Uniqueness of Identity Proofs (UIP). Type theory with UIP is sometimes
called extensional,30 while type theory without UIP is called intensional. Thus,
30More precisely, “propositionally extensional”; see §4.B.
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as mentioned in §2.5, it is extensional Martin-Lo¨f type theory for which our
previous construction of Ctx(T) presents free locally cartesian closed categories
(or other kinds of structured categories). However, baldly assuming UIP is
unsatisfying, since it doesn’t fit into the system of rule packages motivated by
universal properties, as described in §2.5. Moreover, this approach provides no
insight into why UIP might be true, or why it isn’t provable.
But to a modern reader with a background in homotopy theory, the above
problem looks familiar: it is the same reason why the homotopy category of
spaces doesn’t have pullbacks. In that case, we consider instead homotopy pull-
backs, where the factorization morphism is required to depend on a choice of
homotopy filling the square. This suggests we should regard Ctx as a “homo-
topy theory” or (∞, 1)-category, thereby explaining why we cannot prove that
x = y is a proposition: diagonals in an (∞, 1)-category are not in general monic.
For instance, in the 2-category of groupoids, the monomorphisms are the fully
faithful functors, but a diagonal G→ G×G is not generally full: its functorial
action on hom-sets
homG(x, y) −→ homG×G((x, x), (y, y)) = homG(x, y)× homG(x, y)
is not an isomorphism if homG(x, y) has more than one element. The first
model of type theory using this idea was constructed by [51] using groupoids;
later authors [10, 63] generalized it using homotopy theory.
This situation should be compared with the remarks about constructive logic
in §3.2. In both cases we have a rule (LEM or UIP) that seems reasonable given
one model or class of models (the category of sets, or all 1-categories). But
this rule turns out not to be provable, because type theory admits more general
models, in some of which the rule is false. This provides us with the proper
attitude towards the rule: assuming it simply means restricting the class of
categories we are interested in, whereas declining to assume it allows us to use
type theory as a syntax for a wider class of models.
Unfortunately, there is much unresolved subtlety in an (∞, 1)-categorical in-
terpretation of type theory. One hopes for an analogue of the 1-categorical sit-
uation, with a “classifying (∞, 1)-category” that is free in some (∞, 1)-category
of structured (∞, 1)-categories, setting up an (∞, 1)-adjunction, but it is quite
difficult to make this precise. In §4.A I will sketch the current state of the art;
until then I will just assume that the problem will be solved somehow, as I
believe it will be.
4.2 Types as ∞-groupoids
In §3.4 we saw that if we decline to assume LEM, we can detect the potential
spatial structure of types internally. Similarly, if we decline to assume UIP,
then types have potential “homotopy space” or “∞-groupoid” structure, and
the natural way to try to detect this is by using the identity types. But what
does x = y mean when it is not just a proposition?
In higher category theory we have a notion of n-groupoid, which is an ∞-
groupoid containing no interesting information above dimension n. This can
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be defined inductively: a 0-groupoid is an ∞-groupoid that is equivalent to
a discrete set, while an (n + 1)-groupoid is one all of whose hom-∞-groupoids
homA(u, v) are n-groupoids. Moreover, we can extend the induction downwards
two more steps: an ∞-groupoid is a 0-groupoid just when each homA(u, v) is
empty or contractible, so it makes sense to define a (−1)-groupoid to be an
∞-groupoid that is either empty or contractible. Similarly, an ∞-groupoid is
a (−1)-groupoid just when its homs are all contractible, so we can define a
(−2)-groupoid to be a contractible one. (See, for instance, [14, §2].)
In particular, when we regard a set as an ∞-groupoid, the proposition that
two elements u, v are equal turns into the (−1)-groupoid homA(u, v). Thus, the
homs of an ∞-groupoid generalize the notion of equality for elements of a set,
so it is natural to expect the type u = v to behave like homA(u, v). This is
correct: we can derive all the composition structure on these hom-objects that
should be present in an ∞-groupoid from the rules in Figure 5 [77, 112]. For
instance, we can construct the composition law
(x = y)× (y = z)→ (x = z)
by applying the eliminator to p : x = y to assume that y is x and p is reflx, in
which case the other given q : y = z has the same type as the goal x = z. (This
is the same as the proof of transitivity of equality in extensional type theory.)
Other aspects of homotopy theory can also be defined using the identity
type. For instance, the loop space Ω(A, a) of a type A at a point a is just the
identity type (a = a). Voevodsky also showed that we can mimic the above
inductive definition of n-groupoids, also called homotopy n-types31: a type A is
an (n+ 1)-type if for all x : A and y : A the type (x = y) is a n-type. We can
start at n = −1 with the propositions as defined in §3.1, i.e. types A such that
for all x : A and y : A we have x = y. We can also start at n = −2 with the
contractible types, which are just the propositions that have an element. Note
that the homotopy 0-types, also called sets, are those that satisfy UIP; so UIP
could equivalently be phrased as “all types are sets”.
Two types are homotopy equivalent if we have f : A → B and g : B → A
such that g ◦ f = 1A and f ◦ g = 1B. However, the type of such data∑
f :A→B
∑
g:B→A(g ◦ f = 1A)× (f ◦ g = 1B) (4.3)
is not a correct definition of the type of homotopy equivalences. (It is correct if A
and B are sets, in which case we generally say isomorphism or bijection rather
than equivalence.) The problem is that given f : A→ B, the rest of (4.3):∑
g:B→A(g ◦ f = 1A)× (f ◦ g = 1B) (4.4)
may not be a proposition, whereas we want “being an equivalence” to be a mere
property of a morphism. For instance, if f is the identity map of the homotopical
circle S1 (see §4.5), then (4.4) is equivalent to Z. Thus if we took (4.3) as our
31Voevodsky’s terminology [116] is “type of h-level n+ 2”.
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definition of equivalence, there would be “infinitely many self-equivalences of
S1”, which is not correct: up to homotopy there should be only two.
Many equivalent ways to correct (4.3) are now known; here are a few:∑
f :A→B
∑
g:B→A
∑
h:B→A(g ◦ f = 1A)× (f ◦ h = 1B) (4.5)∑
f :A→B
∑
g:B→A
∑
η:g◦f=1A
∑
ǫ:f◦g=1B
f(η) = ǫf . (4.6)∑
f :A→B
∥∥∥∑g:B→A(g ◦ f = 1A)× (f ◦ g = 1B)∥∥∥ (4.7)∑
f :A→B
∏
y:B
((∑
x:A f(x) = y
)
is contractible
)
(4.8)
Each of these admits maps back and forth from (4.3), while the data after the∑
f :A→B form a proposition. We can think of these as building contractible
cell complexes. For instance, in (4.5) we glue on two 1-cells g, h each with
a contracting 2-cell, giving a contractible space; whereas in (4.3) we glue on
one 1-cell with two contracting 2-cells, giving a non-contractible 2-sphere. And
in (4.6) we add to (4.3) a 3-cell filler, getting a contractible 3-ball.
When making definitions of this sort, we generally think of types as ∞-
groupoids (or homotopy spaces), just as in §3.2 we thought of types as sets.
However, since type theory presents an initial structured (∞, 1)-category, these
definitions can also be interpreted in any structured (∞, 1)-category, yielding
“classifying spaces” for n-types and equivalences. For example, given Γ ⊢ A type
and Γ ⊢ B type, if Γ ⊢ Equiv(A,B) type denotes the type of equivalences (with
any of the corrected definitions above), then the object JEquiv(A,B)K → JΓK of
the slice category has the universal property that for any map f : X → JΓK, lifts
of f to JEquiv(A,B)K are equivalent to homotopy equivalences f∗JAK ≃ f∗JBK
overX . (See [63, §3] or [104, §4].) In other words, JEquiv(A,B)K is a “classifying
space for equivalences between JAK and JBK”.
4.3 Extensionality and Univalence
In §3.4 we “actualized” the potential spatial structure of types by adding axioms
such as a dominance or a type of smooth reals. Similarly, we can add axioms
ensuring that there really are types with higher groupoid structure — i.e. that
not all types are sets, or that UIP fails. The only serious contender for such an
axiom at present is Voevodsky’s univalence axiom.
To explain univalence, let us return to the type constructors discussed in
§§2.5 and 2.6. We claimed that the rules for coproduct types, function types,
subobject classifiers, and so on express their desired categorical universal prop-
erties. For most types this is literally true, but there are a couple of cases32 in
which something is missing from our discussion so far.
32What these cases have in common is that they are “mapping in” universal properties.
“Mapping out” universal properties, like that for coproducts, can be expressed more powerfully
in type theory using a dependent output such as in (2.9), enabling us to derive their full
universal property from the basic rules. (Of course, the cartesian product also has a “mapping
in” universal property, but it doesn’t have this problem; formally this is because the classifying
category is better described as a sort of “cartesian multicategory” in which the cartesian
product also has a “mapping out” universal property.)
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Firstly, the universal property of an exponential object requires that any
map X × JAK → JBK factors through a unique map X → JBKJAK. For JA→ BK
to be JBK
JAK
, therefore, requires that if Γ ⊢ f : A → B and Γ ⊢ g : A → B
and Γ, x : A ⊢ h : f(x) = g(x), then also Γ ⊢ e : f = g (because elements
of the identity type induce equalities of morphisms in Ctx, or homotopies in
Ctx). This is not derivable from the rules in Figure 1; it is an extra axiom called
function extensionality. Informally, it says that two functions are equal if they
take equal values. (Dependent function types require a similar axiom.)
Secondly, the universal property of a subobject classifier requires that a
mono M → JΓK is classified by a unique map JΓK → Ω; or equivalently, two
maps JΓK → Ω classifying the same subobject of JΓK are equal. Here “the same”
means isomorphism in Ctx/JΓK; a classifying map only determines a mono up
to isomorphism anyway. Type-theoretically, this means that if Γ ⊢ P : Ω and
Γ ⊢ Q : Ω and Γ ⊢ h : Equiv(P,Q), then Γ ⊢ e : P = Q. This is not derivable
from the rules in §2.6; it is an extra axiom called propositional extensionality.
(Note that two propositions are equivalent as soon as each implies the other.)
When we try to generalize propositional extensionality for Ω to a statement
about type universes U , things become more subtle. We still expect classifying
maps to classify only up to isomorphism — or better, up to homotopy equiva-
lence, which leads us towards homotopical classifying spaces. In traditional ho-
motopy theory (e.g. [85]), homotopy classes of maps into a classifying space cor-
respond to homotopy equivalence classes of fibrations over it. But in an (∞, 1)-
category, it is more natural to ask directly that the ∞-groupoid hom(X,U ) is
equivalent to a full sub-∞-groupoid of the slice category over X ; this gives the
notion of an object classifier [79, §6.1.6]. Type-theoretically, the corresponding
condition is that for Γ ⊢ A : U and Γ ⊢ B : U , the type Γ ⊢ (A = B) type (i.e.
the ∞-groupoid of homotopies between classifying maps) is equivalent to the
type Equiv(A,B) of homotopy equivalences as in §4.2. More precisely, identity-
elimination yields a function idtoeqvA,B : (A = B) → Equiv(A,B), and we
should require that this map is itself an equivalence.
This axiom is due to Voevodsky, who dubbed it univalence.33 Univalence
clearly implies propositional extensionality, while Voevodsky showed [116] that
it also implies function extensionality; see e.g. [111, §4.9]. Univalence also does
indeed ensure that not all types are sets (i.e. homotopy 0-types). For instance,
if B : U has a nontrivial automorphism, such as B = 1+1, then Equiv(B,B) is
not a proposition. Hence neither is the equality type B = B in U , so U is not
a set. More generally, with a hierarchy of universes Un with Un : Un+1, each
Un is not an n-type [66].
33By analogy with function extensionality and propositional extensionality, univalence could
be called typal extensionality. In particular, like function extensionality and propositional
extensionality, univalence is an “extensionality” property, meaning that “types are determined
by their behavior”. For this reason, it is unfortunate that the phrase “extensional type
theory” has come to refer to type theory with UIP, which is incompatible with univalence.
Historically, the special case of univalence when A and B are sets, in which case one can
use (4.3) without “correction”, was proposed by Hofmann and Streicher [51] under the name
“universe extensionality”, but it didn’t attract much attention.
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In particular, for models in the category of sets, or more generally in any
1-category, univalence must be false. For instance, any “Grothendieck universe”
in ZFC set theory can be used as a type-theoretic universe U in Set; but it is
not univalent, since it would be a set (a 0-type), whereas the above argument
shows no univalent universe containing a 2-element set can be a set.
Formally, univalence is an axiom like UIP and LEM that cuts down our
collection of models, only now in a way that excludes all 1-categories. Just
as the topological axioms from §3.4 are incompatible with LEM, univalence is
incompatible with UIP. These two oppositions are essentially independent: the
topos of sets satisfies both LEM and UIP, the toposes of consequential spaces
and continuous sets satisfy UIP together with topological axioms instead of
LEM, and the (∞, 1)-category of ∞-groupoids satisfies univalence instead of
UIP but still satisfies LEM. (In particular, LEM does not rule out all “spatial”
interpretations of type theory, at least if we regard ∞-groupoids as a kind of
“space”.) Finally, in §5 we will mention some (∞, 1)-categories that combine
topological axioms with univalence, thus satisfying neither LEM nor UIP.34
To a homotopy theorist or higher category theorist, assuming univalence in-
stead of UIP is obviously the right move; but it can be a difficult step for those
used to thinking of types as sets. However, univalence can also be motivated
from purely type-theoretic considerations, as giving a “correct” answer to the
question “what are the identity types of a universe?”, just as function exten-
sionality answers “what are the identity types of a function type?”. And from
a philosophical point of view, univalence says that all properties of types are
invariant under equivalence, since we can make any equivalence into an equal-
ity and apply transport; thus it expresses a strong “structural” nature of type
theory [7, 34], in contrast to ZFC-style set theory.
For the homotopy theorist, univalence is one place where we start to see the
advantage of the type-theoretic syntax. Inside type theory, the “elements” of a
universe type U are themselves types, in contrast to the classical construction
of classifying spaces whose “points” often lack a meaning directly connected to
the things being classified. This enables us to define other classifying spaces and
operations between them in a very intuitive way. For instance, if G is a group
(meaning a set, a 0-type, with a group structure), we can define its classifying
space to be “the type of free transitive G-sets”:
BG =
∑
A:U
∑
a:G×A→A(A is a set and a is a free transitive action)
That is, an element of BG is a tuple (A, a, . . . ) consisting of a type, an action
of G on that type, and witnesses of the truth of the necessary axioms. It turns
out that BG is a connected 1-type with Ω(BG) = G. If G is abelian, we can
define an operation BG×BG→ BG by taking the “tensor product” of G-sets,
and so on.
This definition of BG also immediately defines the objects it classifies: a
“torsor” over a type X is just a function X → BG. The first component of such
34Most “classicality” properties such as the axiom of choice behave similarly to LEM in this
way, but some very strong choice principles do conflict with univalence, such as the existence
of a global “Hilbert choice” operator; see [111, §3.2 and Exercise 3.11].
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a function is a map X → U , corresponding to a dependent type x : X ⊢ A type,
and hence a map JAK → JXK. The rest of the classifying map equips this with
the usual structure of a torsor over X .
In fact, any definition of a structure in type theory automatically defines
the classifying space for such structures, and therefore also automatically the
corresponding notion of “bundle of structures”. For instance, a group can be
considered a tuple (G, e,m, . . . ) of a set, an identity, a multiplication, and proofs
of the axioms, giving a definition of “the type of groups”:
Group =
∑
G:U
∑
e:G
∑
m:G×G→G(G is a set and (m, e) is a group structure).
We then automatically obtain a notion of a “family of groups”, namely a func-
tion X → Group. This turns out to correspond precisely to a local system of
groups in the sense of classical homotopy theory. Similarly, we can define a
spectrum to be a sequence of pointed types (Xn, xn) each of which is the loop
space of the next; thus “the type of spectra” is
Spectrum =
∑
X:N→U
∑
x:
∏
n:N
Xn
∏
n:N
(
(Xn, xn) = Ω(Xn+1, xn+1)
)
.
This yields automatically a notion of “parametrized spectrum”, namely a func-
tion X → Spectra. The homotopy groups of a spectrum are functions πn :
Spectrum → AbGroup, while the Eilenberg–Mac Lane construction is a func-
tion H : AbGroup → Spectrum; these then act by simple composition to re-
late parametrized spectra and local systems. Thus, type theory automatically
handles generalizations to “parametrized spaces”, which in classical homotopy
theory and category theory have to be done by hand.
4.4 Higher inductive types
In §2.5 we mentioned type constructors corresponding to coproducts, products,
exponentials, initial and terminal objects, diagonals, and natural numbers ob-
jects. Combining dependent sum types with the identity type yields all finite
limits; for instance, the pullback of f : A→ C and g : B → C is∑
x:A
∑
y:B(f(x) = g(y)).
Moreover, with the natural numbers type we can express certain infinite limits,
e.g. the limit of a sequence · · ·
p2
−→ A2
p1
−→ A1
p0
−→ A0 is∑
f :
∏
n:N
An
∏
n:N pn(f(n+ 1)) = f(n).
However, to represent colimits other than coproducts we need new type con-
structors. For instance, the rules for the coequalizer type coeq(f, g) are shown
in Figure 6. The first is formation: any f, g : A → B have a coequalizer. The
next two are introduction: there is a map B → coeq(f, g), and the two compos-
ites A ⇒ B → coeq(f, g) are equal. The third is the elimination rule, which is
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Γ ⊢ f : A→ B Γ ⊢ g : A→ B
Γ ⊢ coeq(f, g) type
Γ ⊢ N : B
Γ ⊢ 〈N〉 : coeq(f, g)
Γ ⊢M : A
Γ ⊢ ceq(M) : 〈f(M)〉 = 〈g(M)〉
Γ, z : coeq(f, g) ⊢ C type Γ, y : B ⊢ cB : C[〈y〉/z]
Γ, x : A ⊢ cA : ceq(x)∗(cB[f(x)/y]) = cB[g(x)/y] Γ ⊢ P : coeq(f, g)
Γ ⊢ cind(C, cB , cA, P ) : C[P/z]
...
Γ ⊢ cind(C, cB , cA, 〈N〉) = cB[N/y]
...
Γ ⊢ apcind(C,cB ,cA)(ceq(M)) = cA[M/x]
Figure 6: The rules for coequalizer types
analogous to the case analysis rule (2.9). To understand this, consider first the
simpler version analogous to (2.8), where C does not depend on coeq(f, g):
Γ ⊢ C type Γ, y : B ⊢ cB : C
Γ, x : A ⊢ cA : cB[f(x)/y] = cB[g(x)/y] Γ ⊢ P : coeq(f, g)
Γ ⊢ cind(C, cB , cA, P ) : C
.
This expresses the existence part of the universal property of a coequalizer:
given a map B → C such that the composites A ⇒ B → C are equal, there is
an induced map coeq(f, g)→ C.
As with coproducts, the more general version in Figure 6 also implies the
uniqueness part of the universal property. It contains one new aspect: if C
depends on coeq(f, g), then cB[f(x)/y] and cB[g(x)/y] have different types
C[f(x)/y] and C[g(x)/y], so we cannot write “cB[f(x)/y] = cB[g(x)/y]”. But
we have ceq(x) : f(x) = g(x), so the types C[f(x)/y] and C[g(x)/y] ought to be
“the same”; but formally we need to “transport” cB[f(x)/y] along ceq(x) (us-
ing identity-elimination) to get an element of C[g(x)/y] that we can compare to
cB[g(x)/y]. This is what the notation ceq(x)∗(cB [f(x)/y]) means.
Finally, the last two rules (in which I have omitted the premises for brevity)
are the computation rules. The first says that when a map coeq(f, g) → C is
induced by the universal property, the composite B → coeq(f, g)→ C is indeed
the original map B → C. The second says similarly that the “induced equality”
between the composites A ⇒ B → coeq(f, g) → C is the originally given one.
(Don’t worry about the notation; it’s not important for us.)
If this “equality of equalities” sounds weird, recall that in homotopy type the-
ory, the type x = y represents the hom-∞-groupoid, and hence can have many
different elements. Thus, it makes sense to ask whether two such “equalities”
are equal. In fact, when we regard type theory as presenting an (∞, 1)-category
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rather than a 1-category, the type coeq(f, g) represents an ∞-categorical co-
equalizer, a.k.a. homotopy coequalizer. From this we can build all finite (ho-
motopy) colimits, as in [79, Corollary 4.4.2.4]. We also obtain certain infinite
colimits: e.g. the coproduct of a countably infinite family A : N → U is just∑
n:NAn, and the colimit of a sequence A0
f0
−→ A1
f1
−→ A2
f2
−→ · · · is the coequal-
izer of two maps (
∑
n:NAn)⇒ (
∑
n:NAn).
The rules for coeq(f, g) do not require any ∞-categorical behavior, and are
perfectly consistent with UIP. In particular, adding them to extensional MLTT
yields a type theory for locally cartesian closed categories with finite colimits.
Nevertheless, types such as coeq(f, g) were not widely studied prior to the advent
of homotopy type theory; they are known as higher inductive types.
In general, an inductive type W is specified by a list of constructors,
which are (possibly dependent) functions into W . For instance, the coproduct
A+ B is the inductive type specified by two constructors inl : A→ A +B and
inr : B → A+B. (The empty type ∅ is inductively specified by no constructors.)
The constructors are the introduction rules of the resulting type, while the
elimination rule says that to define a map out of the inductive type it is sufficient
to specify its behavior on the constructors.
A higher inductive type (HIT) is similar, but the constructors can also
be functions into equality types of the HIT. For instance, coeq(f, g) is specified
by two constructors 〈–〉 : B → coeq(f, g) and ceq :
∏
x:A(〈f(x)〉 = 〈g(x)〉).
The word “inductive” comes from the fact that in general, the type being
defined is allowed to appear in the domains of its constructors in certain limited
ways. For instance, the natural numbers are the inductive type specified by two
constructors 0 : N (a 0-ary function) and succ : N → N. Informally, this means
that the elements of N are generated by applying the constructors successively
any number of times; thus we have 0, succ(0), succ(succ(0)), and so on.
When combined with higher constructors, this additional feature is quite
powerful; for instance, the propositional truncation ‖A‖ from Figure 4 is the HIT
specified by two constructors |– | : A→ ‖A‖ and tprp :
∏
x,y:‖A‖(x = y). We can
similarly construct an n-truncation that is the universal map A→ ‖A‖n into a
homotopy n-type (i.e. its nth Postnikov section). In particular, the 0-truncation
‖A‖0 is the “set of connected components”.
“Recursive” HITs of this sort can also be used to construct more exotic
objects, such as homotopical localizations. Given a map f : S → T , we say that
a type A is f-local if the map (– ◦ f) : (T → A)→ (S → A) is an equivalence.
The f-localization is the universal map from a type X into an f -local type
LfX . In classical homotopy theory, constructing localizations in general requires
a fairly elaborate transfinite composition. But in homotopy type theory, we can
simply define LfX to be the HIT generated by the following constructors:
• A map η : X → LfX .
• For each g : S → LfX and t : T , an element ext(g, t) : LfX .
• For each g : S → LfX and s : S, an equality ext(g, f(s)) = g(s).
• For each g : S → LfX and t : T , an element ext′(g, t) : LfX .
• For each h : T → LfX and t : T , an equality ext
′(h ◦ f, t) = h(t).
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The last four constructors combine to lift (– ◦ f) to an element of (4.5). (This
is why we have both ext and ext′; if we collapsed them into one we would only
get (4.3).) This is one example of how homotopy type theory gives a “direct”
way of working with objects and constructions that in classical homotopy theory
must be laboriously built up out of sets. For more examples and theory of higher
inductive types and their applications, see [111, Chapter 6].
4.5 Synthetic homotopy theory
With HITs we can define many familiar spaces from classical homotopy theory.
For instance, in the ∞-category of ∞-groupoids, the circle S1 is the homotopy
coequalizer of 1 ⇒ 1; thus we expect the corresponding coequalizer type to
behave like an “internal S1” in homotopy type theory. It is equivalently the HIT
generated by two constructors base : S1 and loop : base = base; its elimination
rule (universal property) says roughly that to give a map S1 → C is equivalent
to giving a point c : C and a loop l : c = c.
Since HITs are consistent with UIP, this “circle” may not behave as expected:
in a 1-category, the coequalizer of 1 ⇒ 1 is just 1. But if we also assume
univalence, type theory becomes a powerful tool for working directly with ∞-
groupoids such as S1. By the universal property of S1, to give a dependent
type C : S1 → U we must give a type B : U and an equality B = B; but by
univalence the latter is the same as an autoequivalence of B. For instance, if
B is Z, we can use the autoequivalence “+1”; the resulting dependent type is
then a version of the universal cover of S1. With a little extra work [76], we can
adapt the classical calculation of π1(S
1) to show, in type theory, that ΩS1 ≃ Z.
This is the first theorem of a growing field known as synthetic homotopy
theory, more of which can be found in [111, Chapter 8] and recent work such
as [23, 43, 75]. Just as in the synthetic topology of §3.4 the types come automati-
cally with topological structure, which we can then study “synthetically” rather
than breaking it down into a set equipped with a topology, in synthetic ho-
motopy theory the types come automatically with homotopical or ∞-groupoid
structure, which we can then study synthetically rather than breaking it down
into any explicit definition of an∞-groupoid. Thus it is a “model-independent”
language for homotopy theory, avoiding the need to choose (say) topological
spaces or simplicial sets as a definition of “∞-groupoid.”
It is too early to say how useful this will be to classical homotopy theory. In
its very short existence so far, synthetic homotopy theory has not led to proofs of
any new theorems, but it has shown an impressive ability to produce new proofs
of old theorems: as of this writing, synthetic homotopy theorists have calculated
πn(S
n) = Z, πk(S
n) = 0 for k < n, π3(S
2) = Z, and π4(S
3) = Z/2Z, and proven
numerous foundational results such as the Freudenthal suspension theorem, the
Blakers–Massey connectivity theorem, and the Serre spectral sequence.
More importantly, the theorems of synthetic homotopy theory are more gen-
eral than those of classical homotopy theory, because (modulo subtleties to be
mentioned in §4.A) they apply in any well-behaved (∞, 1)-category, including
any ∞-topos [79, 91]. (Some ∞-toposes of interest to classical homotopy the-
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orists include equivariant and parametrized homotopy theory.) A particularly
interesting example is the Blakers–Massey theorem, for which no purely homo-
topical proof applicable to∞-toposes was known prior to the synthetic one [43];
the latter has now been translated back into categorical language [93].
Finally, synthetic homotopy theory gives a new way to think about the
“homotopy hypothesis” of Grothendieck [12] that∞-groupoids describe the ho-
motopy theory of spaces. Rather than looking for an equivalence between some
notions of ∞-groupoid and space, we have a synthetic theory of ∞-groupoids
that is modeled by classical homotopy spaces — but also other things. (In fact,
Brunerie has observed that the∞-groupoid structure of types in homotopy type
theory looks almost exactly as it was envisioned by Grothendieck [82], rather
than like any of the definitions of ∞-groupoid used more commonly today.) In
§5 I will sketch a particular context in which this extra generality is useful.
4.A The classifying (∞, 1)-category
In this appendix to §4 I will describe the “classifying (∞, 1)-category” infor-
mally, then give a precise definition of it, and end with some remarks about the
current state of knowledge as regards its freeness. This appendix and §4.B are
provided to satisfy the curious reader, but can be skipped without consequence.
Let T be an intensional type theory. We define the objects and morphisms
of its classifying (∞, 1)-category Ctx (T) just as we did for the classifying 1-
category Ctx(T) in §2.4. However, we do not quotient the morphisms by terms
in the equality type. Instead we will use those to define the 2-morphisms, as
well as 3-morphisms, 4-morphisms, and so on.
The idea is to generalize the representation of equalities using diagonals
to a characterization of 2-morphisms. Given morphisms f, g : A → B in an
(∞, 1)-category, their “equalizer” is a morphism e : E → A equipped with a 2-
morphism fe ∼= ge that is “universal” among such 2-morphisms. In particular,
to give a 2-morphism f ∼= g is equivalent to giving a section of e (that is, a
morphism s : A → E and a 2-morphism es ∼= 1A). As in the 1-categorical
case, this equalizer can be constructed, up to equivalence, as the pullback of
the diagonal B → B × B along (f, g) : A → B × B. Thus, assuming that
the identity type of B still presents the diagonal (up to the appropriate sort
of (∞, 1)-categorical equivalence), and substitution still presents pullback, 2-
morphisms f ∼= g should be equivalent to terms of the form
x : A ⊢ p(x) : f(x) =B g(x). (4.9)
Hence we simply define a 2-morphism in Ctx(T) to be a term of this sort.
Similarly, we define a 3-morphism p ∼= q to be a term in an iterated identity
type x : A ⊢ h(x) : p(x) =(f(x)=Bg(x)) q(x), and so on.
To make this precise, we need to choose a method of presenting (∞, 1)-
categories. In principle there are many options, but at present the method of
choice for defining Ctx(T) is to use fibration categories [22]. A fibration category
(or “category of fibrant objects”) is a 1-category with two classes of morphisms
49
called weak equivalences and fibrations, satisfying certain axioms, e.g. pullbacks
of fibrations exist and preserve weak equivalences. The most important axiom
is that every diagonal A → A × A factors as a weak equivalence followed by a
fibration, with the intermediate object called a path object PA for A.
Of course, this is an abstraction of a common situation from homotopy
theory: fibrations of topological spaces, Kan simplicial sets, or chain complexes
(and more generally the fibrations between fibrant objects in any Quillen model
category) all have these properties. Generalizing these examples, in any fibration
category we define a homotopy between f, g : A⇒ B to be a lift of (f, g) : A→
B×B to a map A→ PB. We can similarly define higher homotopies and thereby
construct a more explicit notion of (∞, 1)-category (such as a quasicategory),
although the combinatorics are somewhat involved; see [108].
Now, if in the definition of Ctx(T) from §2.4 we omit the quotient of mor-
phisms,35 we obtain a fibration category Ctx(T). Its fibrations are the com-
posites of projections JΓ, x : AK → JΓK, its weak equivalences are the homo-
topy equivalences defined in §4.2, and its path objects are the identity types
P JAK = Jx : A, y : A, p : x = yK. (The fact that identity types satisfy the
axioms of path objects was one of the central insights of Awodey and War-
ren [10, 120].) With this definition, homotopies in the fibration-category sense
correspond bijectively to terms of the form (4.9): The former are lifts as on the
left below, whereas the latter are sections as on the right.
IdB

JAK
(f,g)
//
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JBK× JBK
Jx : A, p : f(x) = g(x)K

//
❴
✤
IdB

JAK
(f,g)
//
DD
JBK× JBK
Thus, we may define Ctx (T) to be the (∞, 1)-category presented by Ctx(T).
Here we see the second advantage of syntax mentioned in §2.1: giving a presen-
tation of a free object (here, an (∞, 1)-category) that is actually stricter (here,
a fibration category) than one would expect from only its universal property.
However, although this Ctx(T) has some of the expected structure [62, 64],
no one has yet proven its (∞, 1)-categorical freeness. Instead, to interpret type
theory in (∞, 1)-categories, we use the fact that Ctx(T) is free in a category
of structured fibration categories. The latter have various names like “contex-
tual categories” [26], “comprehension categories” [54], “categories with fami-
lies” [38], “categories with attributes” [26], “display map categories” [109, §8.3],
“type-theoretic fibration categories” [105], “tribes” [61], “C-systems” [117], and
so on. Although this approach has proven more tractable, it is still quite dif-
ficult, for two reasons. One is that, as mentioned for the 1-categorical case in
§2.5, complete proofs of the freeness of Ctx(T) have been given only for a few
particular type theories [107]. Everyone expects these proofs to generalize to all
other type theories, but actually writing down such a generalization, and in a
useful amount of generality, is a current research problem.
35Technically, we replace it with a different quotient; see §4.B.
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X elt
X ≡ X
X ≡ Y
Y ≡ X
X ≡ Y Y ≡ Z
X ≡ Z
X ≡ X ′ Y ≡ Y ′
(XY ) ≡ (X ′Y ′)
X ≡ Y
X−1 ≡ Y −1
X elt Y elt Z elt
(X(Y Z)) ≡ ((XY )Z)
X elt
(Xe) ≡ X
X elt
(eX) ≡ X
X elt
(XX−1) ≡ e
X elt
(X−1X) ≡ e
Figure 7: Equality rules for free groups
Another difficulty is that this approach incurs a new proof obligation. In
principle, a type theory T should be interpreted in an (∞, 1)-category C by
means of the unique functor Ctx (T)→ C determined by the universal property
of Ctx(T). If we stick with the 1-categorical universal property of Ctx(T), then
to interpret T in C we need to also present C by a fibration category of the
appropriate sort. This is a sort of “coherence theorem” for structured (∞, 1)-
categories — which, again, is known in some particular cases, but a fully general
version of which is a current research problem; the state of the art includes [4,
45, 62, 63, 78, 103–106, 113]. (Part of this coherence theorem is showing that
pullbacks of fibrations can be made strictly functorial and preserve all the type
operations strictly, which is nontrivial even for 1-categories [30, 35, 49, 50].)
I have chosen not to dwell on these issues because I have faith that they
will eventually be resolved. Instead I want to focus on the picture that such a
resolution will make possible (and which is substantially achievable even with
current technology). Thus one might call this chapter a “programme” for ho-
motopy type theory and its higher-categorical semantics. In §4.B I will briefly
discuss another technical detail; in §5 we will return to the programme.
4.B Judgmental Equality
In §2.1 we described both the “tautological” and the “reduced-words” presen-
tation of a free group using “rules” in the style of type theory. For the reduced-
words description, this is the end of the definition; but for the tautological
description, we need to describe the equivalence relation to quotient by. This
can also be defined inductively by the rules shown in Figure 7, which essentially
say that it is the smallest equivalence relation imposing the group axioms and
compatible with the operations. We also remarked that there is an algorithm
for “reducing” any word from the tautological presentation, so that two terms
are related by ≡ precisely when they reduce to the same result. Finally, in §3.3
we mentioned that type theory includes an analogous “reduction algorithm”
making it into a general-purpose programming language.
Taken together, these remarks suggest that there should be two forms of type
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theory, one involving an equivalence relation ≡ and one not, with a “reduction
algorithm” mapping the first to the second. This is more or less correct, but it
turns out to be quite fiddly to describe the second type theory without reference
to the first. It is sometimes possible [48], but more common is to describe only
a type theory involving ≡, with the reduction algorithm an endofunction of
its terms, and then define the “canonical forms” to be those that are “fully
reduced”. This is also more flexible, since we can add new ≡ axioms without
knowing whether there is a corresponding reduction algorithm that terminates
at a canonical form (or even knowing that there isn’t!). The relation ≡ is known
as judgmental equality or definitional equality or substitutional equality.36
Just as for free groups, when defining the corresponding free object we have
to quotient by the relation ≡. For the classifying 1-category Ctx(T), this quo-
tient is included in the quotient by terms of the identity type. But for the
fibration category Ctx(T), where we omitted the latter quotient, we do still
have to impose a quotient by judgmental equality — or, if our type theory has a
terminating reduction algorithm (the technical term is “strongly normalizing”),
use only the canonical forms to represent objects and morphisms.
The puzzling thing, of course, is how this equality ≡ is related to the equality
type x : A, y : A ⊢ (x = y) type. Formally, the difference between these “two
equalities” is analogous to the difference between the variables x : A occurring
in a context and the “meta-variables” such as Γ that we use in describing the
operations of the theory. Any inductive definition uses “meta-variables” and can
have an inductively defined equivalence relation; type theory is special because
internal to the theory there are also notions of “variable” and “equality”. The
identity type is defined by a universal property, just like most other types;
whereas judgmental equality, like the equivalence relation on words in a free
group, is inductively defined as the smallest equivalence relation imposing the
desired axioms (the computation rules from §2.5, which we denoted with ≡ for
this very reason) and respected by all the other judgments. The latter condition
means we have additional rules such as:
Γ ⊢ a : A
Γ ⊢ a ≡ a
Γ ⊢ a ≡ b
Γ ⊢ b ≡ a
Γ ⊢ a ≡ b Γ ⊢ b ≡ c
Γ ⊢ a ≡ c
Γ ⊢ a : A Γ ⊢ A ≡ B
Γ ⊢ a : B
(4.10)
This formal description, however, does not really explain why we need two
equalities, or what they mean intuitively. To start with, it cannot be emphasized
strongly enough that it is the identity type that represents mathematical equality.
Equality in mathematics is a proposition, and in particular something that
can be hypothesized and proven or disproven. Judgmental equality cannot be
hypothesized (added to a context), nor can it be proven (inhabited by a term) or
disproven (we cannot even state internally a “negation” of judgmental equality).
36Technically, these three terms have slightly different meanings, but in the most common
type theories they all turn out to refer to the same thing.
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In its simplest form, judgmental equality is simply the algorithmic process of
expanding definitions (hence the name “definitional equality”): for instance,
the function λx.x2 is by definition the function that squares its argument, so
(λx.x2)(y+1) is by definition equal to (y+1)2. But even the simplest equalities
with mathematical content, such as the theorem that x+ y = y+ x for x, y : N,
are not a mere matter of expanding definitions but require proof.
What, then, can we do with judgmental equality? The main property it has
that the identity type doesn’t is (4.10): given a : A and A ≡ B, the same term a
is also an element ofB (hence the name “substitutional equality”). In particular,
if a ≡ b, then (a = a) ≡ (a = b), so that refla : a = b; thus judgmental equality
implies mathematical equality. By contrast, given a : A and a mathematical
equality e : A = B, it is possible to obtain a term of B, but that term is not
syntactically equal to a; instead it is e∗(a), involving the transport operation.
This need for explicit transports is somewhat annoying, so it is tempting to
eliminate it by collapsing the two equalities with a reflection rule
Γ ⊢ p : a = b
Γ ⊢ a ≡ b
.
Unfortunately, this makes it impossible to detect ≡ using a reduction algorithm,
since questions of mathematical equality cannot be decided algorithmically. The
reflection rule also turns out to imply UIP, which is a dealbreaker if we want to
talk about (∞, 1)-categories. The (∞, 1)-categorical point of view also makes
clear why we need to notate e in e∗(a): since the type A = B is (by univalence)
the type of equivalences from A to B, it could have many different elements, so
that e∗(a) really does depend on the choice of e.
One might then be tempted to go to the other extreme and try to eliminate
judgmental equality entirely. We could in principle express all the computation
rules from §2.5 using elements of identity types rather than judgmental equal-
ities. However, the resulting proliferation of transport operations would be so
extreme as to render the theory essentially unusable. We need a happy medium,
with a judgmental equality as strong as feasible but no stronger.
The intuitive meaning of judgmental equality is not entirely clear, although
in some ways it is analogous to Frege’s “equality of sense” (with mathematical
equality analogous to “equality of reference”). Categorically, judgmental equal-
ity is analogous to the “point-set-level” or “strict” equality occurring in strict
or semistrict models for higher categories, such as Quillen model categories or
Gray-categories. This finds a formal expression in the fibration-category ap-
proach to semantics, where we need a “semistrictification” theorem presenting
any (∞, 1)-category by a fibration category satisfying all the judgmental equal-
ities of our type theory strictly. Finding the right balance of strictness and
weakness here is an active frontier of research.
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5 Cohesive homotopy type theory
5.1 Spaces versus ∞-groupoids
Twice now we have encountered something called a “circle”: in §3.4 we men-
tioned that S1 =
{
(x, y) : R× R | x2 + y2 = 1
}
has the correct topology, and in
§4.5 we mentioned that S1 = coeq(1 ⇒ 1) has the correct fundamental group.
However, these two types S1 and S1 are very different! The first S1 is a set in the
sense of §4.2; whereas S1 is definitely not, since its loop space is Z. On the other
hand, S1 is connected, in the sense that its 0-truncation
∥∥S1∥∥
0
is contractible;
whereas since S1 is a set, it is its own 0-truncation.
What is happening is that classical homotopy theory has led us to confuse
two different things in our minds. On one hand, a topological space is a set with
a notion of “cohesion” enabling us to define continuous functions and paths.
The nearby points of a continuous path are “close” in some sense, but they are
still distinct. On the other hand, an ∞-groupoid has a collection of “points” or
“objects”, plus for each pair of objects a collection hom(x, y) of equivalences or
“ways in which x and y are the same”, plus for each f, g ∈ hom(x, y) a collection
homhom(x,y)(f, g) of ways in which f and g are the same, and so on. When
hom(x, y) is nonempty, x and y really are the same to ∞-groupoid theory, just
as in plain category theory we do not distinguish between isomorphic objects.
The relation between topological spaces and ∞-groupoids is that from any
spaceX we can construct an∞-groupoid sX , called its fundamental∞-groupoid
or shape.37 The objects of sX are the points of X , the objects of hom(x, y) are
the continuous paths from x to y, the objects of homhom(x,y)(f, g) are the con-
tinuous endpoint-preserving homotopies from f to g, and so on. The confusion
arises because we can study sX without actually constructing it (or even having
a definition of “∞-groupoid”), by working with X itself and “doing everything
up to homotopy”; and historically, people did this for a long time before they
even thought of defining ∞-groupoids. Thus, algebraic topologists came to use
the word “space” for objects that were actually being treated as∞-groupoids.38
Homotopy type theory forcibly brings the distinction between topological
spaces and ∞-groupoids front and center, since it allows us to talk about ∞-
groupoids directly in a foundational system that is also strong enough to study
topological spaces. In particular, we have the previously noted contrast between
the types S1 and S1. The relation between the two ought to be that S1 = sS1;
but how are we to express this in type theory?
37The symbol s is not an integral sign (
∫
) but an “esh”, the IPA sign for a voiceless
postalveolar fricative (English sh); in LATEX it is available as \esh with the package phonetic.
An alternative notation is Π∞, but the letter Π is overworked in type theory already. The
term “shape” comes from “shape theory”, which also studies generalizations of s for ill-behaved
topological spaces.
38Arguably, therefore, ∞-groupoids do not even belong in a book about notions of space.
However, tradition is weighty, and moreover ∞-groupoids do share some important attributes
of notions of space, notably their ability to be present as “background structure” in the sense
described in the introduction. It is to emphasize this aspect, but also their distinctness from
other notions of space, that I sometimes call them homotopy spaces.
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5.2 Combining topology with homotopy
The description of sX in §5.1 treats both topological spaces and∞-groupoids as
structures built out of sets. However, we have seen that in type theory we can
treat both of them synthetically, suggesting that s ought also to have a synthetic
description. This requires combining the perspectives of §§3 and 4, obtaining
a type theory in which topology and homotopy are synthetic at the same time.
That is, we allow some types to have “intrinsic topology”, like S1, and also some
types to have “intrinsic homotopy”, like S1. It follows unavoidably that there
must also be types with both nontrivial topology and nontrivial homotopy.
At this point the advantages of a synthetic treatment become especially
apparent. Classically, to combine structures in this way we have to define a
new structure called a “topological ∞-groupoid” or a “topological ∞-stack”:
an ∞-groupoid equipped with a “topology” on its objects, another on its mor-
phisms, and so on. If such a gadget has no nontrivial morphisms it reduces
to a topological space, while if all the topologies are discrete it reduces to an
ordinary∞-groupoid. Formally, we might define these to be∞-stacks on one of
the sites {N∞} and {Rn}n∈N from §2.7, comprising ∞-toposes of consequential
∞-groupoids and continuous ∞-groupoids (or smooth ∞-groupoids). We would
then need to develop a whole theory of such objects.
In type theory, however, we have seen that types “potentially” have both
topological and homotopical structure, which we can draw out by asserting
axioms such as Brouwer’s theorem or Voevodsky’s univalence axiom. Thus, to
obtain a synthetic theory of “topological ∞-groupoids” is simplicity itself: we
simply assert both groups of axioms at the same time. Of course, to model
the theory in classical mathematics we still need to construct topological ∞-
groupoids, but we don’t need to bother about that when working in the theory.
Schreiber’s chapter argues that topological ∞-groupoids (or some enhance-
ment thereof) are the correct context in which to formulate modern theories of
physics. (For more general discussion of stacks, see the chapter of Mestrano and
Simpson.) The type theory modeled by (∞, 1)-categories of this sort is an active
field of current research called cohesive homotopy type theory [73, 95, 96, 101].
I will conclude by sketching some of its most appealing features.
5.3 Modalities and cohesion
The synthetic description of s involves a different way to access the latent topo-
logical structure of types, based on Lawvere’s ideas of cohesion [73]. Recall from
§2.8 that most “topological” toposes come with a string of adjunctions
topos of spaces
Γ

topos of sets
∆
OO
⊣ ⊣ ∇
OO
where Γ is the underlying-set functor, ∆ constructs discrete spaces, and ∇
constructs indiscrete spaces, and ∆ and ∇ are fully faithful. If we restrict our
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attention to the topos of spaces, then what is left of this adjoint triple is a monad
♯ = ∇Γ that reflects into the subcategory of indiscrete types, a comonad ♭ = ∆Γ
that coreflects into the category of discrete types, and an adjunction ♭ ⊣ ♯ such
that the induced transformations ♯♭→ ♯ and ♭→ ♭♯ are isomorphisms.
We can incorporate ♯ and ♭ in type theory as higher modalities. Traditional
“modal logic” studies propositional modalities, most famously “it is necessary
that P” (usually written P ) and “it is possible that P” (usually written ♦P ),
but also others such as “so-and-so knows that P”, “it will always be the case
that P”, and so on. Since these often have monad- or comonad-like properties
(e.g. P → P and P → P ), and propositions are particular types (see
§3.1), we may consider monads and comonads acting on all types as “higher-
categorical modalities”. I refer to type theory with ♭ and ♯ as spatial type theory,
since it is designed for “topological” models such as consequential, continuous,
and smooth sets or∞-groupoids. We will not state its rules precisely here since
they involve some technicalities, but the practical upshot is that ♭ and ♯ behave
as described above; see [101] for a more extensive discussion.
As an example, these modalities allow us to state “discontinuous” versions
of classicality axioms, such as LEM, that do hold in these intended models.
The usual version of LEM is
∏
P :Ω‖P + ¬P‖, which is false in the topological
models, as discussed in §3.2, because a space is not generally the disjoint union
of a subspace and its complement. But
∏
P :Ω ♯‖P + ¬P‖ and
∏
P :♭Ω‖P + ¬P‖
are true in these models: both equivalently express the true statement that any
space is the smallest subspace of itself containing both any given subspace and
its complement. They imply in particular that the (equivalent) subuniverses
of discrete and indiscrete types satisfy ordinary LEM, and thus are a place for
classical reasoning inside synthetic-topological type theory. (Recall from §3.2
that the indiscrete spaces are also usually the ¬¬-sheaves. This often follows
automatically in spatial type theory; see [101].)
Now, in many cases the functor ∆ also has a left adjoint, i.e. the discrete
spaces are reflective as well as coreflective. A map from a space A into a discrete
set ∆B breaks A up as a coproduct of one disjoint piece for each element of
B. Thus if A is a coproduct of “connected components”, any map A→ ∆B is
uniquely determined by where each connected component goes, i.e. by a map
π0(A)→ B. Thus π0 is left adjoint to ∆, or more precisely any left adjoint to ∆
deserves the name π0. Note that this “π0(A)” is not the same as the 0-truncation
‖A‖0 discussed in §4; the latter treats types as∞-groupoids while this one treats
them as topological spaces. In a moment we will see that π0(A) = ‖sA‖0.
Such a left adjoint π0 exists for continuous sets and smooth sets, though not
for consequential spaces (because the latter contain spaces, like N∞ that are not
locally connected, hence not a coproduct of connected components). A topos
with an adjoint string π0 ⊣ ∆ ⊣ Γ ⊣ ∇ where ∆ and ∇ are fully faithful and π0
preserves finite products (and perhaps more; see [59, 73, 101]) is called cohesive.
Finally, this all works basically the same in the ∞-case: “cohesive ∞-
toposes”, such as continuous and smooth ∞-groupoids, are related to the ∞-
topos of ∞-groupoids by a string of ∞-adjunctions, which can be represented
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by modalities in type theory.39 For intuition, a “discrete” cohesive ∞-groupoid
is one whose topologies are discrete at all levels, i.e. neither its points, nor its
equalities between points, etc., have any interesting topology. It could still have
interesting ∞-groupoid structure; for instance, S1 is discrete (but S1 is not!).
The magical thing is that for ∞-toposes, a left adjoint of ∆ is no longer just
π0; instead, it deserves to be called the shape functor s discussed above! To
prove this is technical (see [95, Proposition 4.3.32] or [25, §3]), but we can get
a feel for it with examples.
First of all, by comparing universal properties, we see that (denoting a left
∞-adjoint of ∆ by s) the set ‖sA‖0 is a reflection of A into discrete sets (i.e.
homotopy 0-types). Thus, the 1-categorical argument above implies that ‖sA‖0
deserves the name π0(A), which is what we expect for the shape of A.
Secondly, we have seen that S1 = coeq(1⇒ 1), and since the discrete types
are closed under colimits (being coreflective), S1 is also discrete. On the other
hand we have S1 = coeq(R ⇒ R), where one map R → R is the identity and
the other is “+1”. Since left adjoints preserve colimits, we will have sS1 = S1
as long as sR = 1. This is true for continuous ∞-groupoids (an analogous fact
about the smooth reals is true for smooth ∞-groupoids).
In fact, the discrete objects in continuous∞-groupoids are essentially defined
by the property that sR = 1. More specifically, a type A is discrete if and only if
every map R→ A is constant, or more precisely if the map const : A→ (R→ A)
is an equivalence. This axiom is called real-cohesion [101]; it immediately implies
that sR = 1. (The real-cohesion axiom also allows us to construct s as a higher
inductive type, by “localizing” in the sense of §4.4 at the map R→ 1.)
We can make similar arguments in other examples. For instance, the topo-
logical 2-sphere S2 is the pushout of two open discs (each isomorphic to R2)
under an open strip (isomorphic to S1 × R). Thus, as long as s preserves prod-
ucts, sS2 is the pushout of two copies of 1 under S1, i.e. the homotopy-theoretic
suspension of S1, which is one definition of the homotopical 2-sphere S2. Many
familiar spaces can be presented as “open cell complexes” of this sort, thereby
identifying their shapes with the expected discrete ∞-groupoids.
We do have to avoid the more classical “closed cell complexes” that glue
intervals and closed discs along boundaries. Gluing the endpoints of the unit
interval [0, 1] in the topos of continuous sets does not produce S1, but rather a
circle with a “speed bump” at which any continuous path must stop for a finite
amount of time before proceeding. This problem is avoided by consequential
spaces, but as remarked previously that topos fails to have s. In fact, as discussed
briefly in [57], it seems impossible to have both closed cell complexes and s.
This description of s enables synthetic arguments that involve both topolog-
ical spaces and homotopy spaces and their relationship. For instance, in [101] I
used sS1 = S1 to prove the Brouwer fixed point theorem synthetically. This is
a theorem about the topological closed disc D2 (whose boundary is S1), but its
39Of course, the formal connection between cohesive ∞-toposes and cohesive type theory
is at least as difficult as the ordinary case discussed in §4.A; indeed the cohesive case has not
yet been studied formally at all. However, the cohesive type theory at least is fully rigorous
as a formal system in its own right, with reference to ∞-toposes only for motivation.
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classical proof uses a homotopical argument, constructing a retraction D2 → S1
which is impossible since S1 is not homotopically contractible. Synthetically, the
proof can be done in almost exactly the same way, inserting s at the last step,
and using the fact that ΩS1 = Z mentioned in §4.5 (which uses the univalence
axiom) so that sS1 (being S1) is not a retract of sD2 (being 1).
At a more advanced level, Schreiber’s chapter in this book shows that smooth
∞-groupoids — and, by extension, cohesive type theory — are a natural setting
for differential cohomology and gauge field theory, which involve the interaction
between smooth spaces and homotopy spaces. The synthetic approach to s is
thus not just a conceptual way to explain the difference between topological and
homotopy spaces, but a practical tool for combining them in applications.
6 Conclusion
What does the future hold for type theory and synthetic mathematics? Current
research divides into two threads. One is “internal”: developing mathematics
in type theory. This includes both ordinary mathematics in constructive logic
without LEM or AC, so as to be valid in all toposes (§3.2); and also more novel
synthetic mathematics using of nonclassical structure (§§3.4, 4 and 5).
The constructivization of ordinary mathematics has a long history, but
plenty of fundamental questions remain unanswered, due in part to a tradi-
tion among some “constructivists” of neglecting propositional truncation and
assuming countable choice. Synthetic mathematics is newer: synthetic differ-
ential geometry is several decades old but not well-known outside topos theory,
while synthetic homotopy theory is only a handful of years old [76, 111], and
synthetic topology is in between. Thus, there are many open questions regarding
which results of “analytic” mathematics can be reproduced synthetically.
The other thread of current research is “meta-theoretic”. As mentioned in
§§4.A–4.B, there are many unsolved problems in the (∞, 1)-categorical seman-
tics of type theory. There are also purely syntactic open problems, such as rec-
onciling the topological/homotopical point of view with the computational one
from §3.3. For instance, can we make HITs and univalence “compute” (i.e. not
break the fragile computational interpretation mentioned in §3.3)? (At present
the most successful approaches to this use “cubical” methods, e.g. [2, 3, 31, 33].)
Some problems involve both syntax and semantics. For instance, homotopy
type theory is an excellent synthetic language for higher groupoids, but what
about higher categories? Any classical definition of (∞, 1)-category (such as
quasicategories) can be repeated inside the sets of type theory, but that would
not be what we want: a good definition of (∞, 1)-category in homotopy type the-
ory should use the synthetic notion of ∞-groupoid provided by the types. The
most promising approach is something like Rezk’s “complete Segal spaces” [92];
this can be done for 1-categories [1], but for the∞-case it would require a notion
of “coherent simplicial type”, which so far has proven elusive.
This is a special case of another open question that I call the “problem of in-
finite objects”, which also applies to other homotopy-theoretic notions like A∞-
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spaces and structured ring spectra. Classically, such infinite coherence struc-
tures involve strict point-set-level equalities. For instance, A∞-spaces are strict
algebras for a topological operad; the weakness is in the operad. But homotopy
type theory, in its most common form, severely restricts the use of strict equal-
ity: it can be accessed only using dependent types (e.g. terms belonging to a
dependent type are strict sections of a fibration) and judgmental equality. This
is good because it makes everything automatically homotopy-invariant, but it
means we lack a flexible way to assemble arbitrary higher coherence structures.
(In particular, while synthetic homotopy theory can do a lot, further technical
advances are needed before it could reproduce all of classical homotopy theory.)
This problem might be solvable completely internally, but it might also require
modifying the syntax, leading to a whole host of new meta-theoretic problems.
Let me end with some remarks about the philosophical implications of syn-
thetic mathematics. I have presented type theory in a way intended to seem
useful and unobjectionable to a classical mathematician: as a syntax for reason-
ing about structured categories in a familiar language. Crucial to the usefulness
of this syntax is the fact that it, like ZFC set theory, is general enough to en-
code all of mathematics, and therefore anything we can prove (constructively)
in ordinary mathematics is automatically also “true internally” in any category.
This leads naturally to a slightly different question: can we actually use type
theory as the foundation for mathematics? That is, must we consider the objects
of mathematics to “really” be built out of sets, with “types” just a convenient
fiction for talking about such structures? Or can we consider types to be the
basic objects of mathematics, with everything else built out of them?
The answer is undoubtedly yes: the “sets” in type theory can encode math-
ematics just like the sets of ZFC can. Of course, there are subtleties. On one
hand, if our type theory is constructive, we need to do our mathematics con-
structively. On another hand, type theory often suggests different ways to do
things, using the synthetic spatial or homotopical structure of types instead of
analytic topological spaces or ∞-groupoids.40 Both of these involve their own
open problems; but they are only potential enhancements or refinements of or-
dinary mathematics, so regardless of how they turn out, it is certainly possible
to treat type theory as a foundation for all of mathematics.
The real question, therefore, is not “can we?” but “should we?” This is
where things get more philosophical. Over the past century, mathematicians
and philosophers have become accustomed to the fundamental objects of math-
ematics being discrete sets, with no spatial or homotopical structure. However,
a priori there is no reason this has to be the case. Indeed, some of the early-
20th-century constructivists, notably Brouwer, can (with a bit of hindsight) be
read as arguing for the intrinsically spatial nature of mathematical objects.
But can spaces really be fundamental like sets are? A discrete set certainly
seems simpler, and hence more fundamental, than a set equipped with spatial
structure. But this argument merely begs the question, since if spaces are funda-
40In particular, for type theory to be an autonomous foundation for mathematics, it ought
to suffice for its own metatheory, including the freeness of its own classifying (∞, 1)-category;
but we don’t yet even know how to define (∞, 1)-categories in homotopy type theory.
59
mental objects then they are not just sets “equipped with spatial structure”. In
spatial type theory there is no obvious non-tautological “structure” with which
we can equip the discrete set of reals ♭R that determines the space of reals
R. Is ♭R “simpler” than R? When we consider all the pathological nowhere-
continuous functions supported by ♭R but not R, it seems at least consistent
to believe that R is the simpler. Moreover, discrete sets are just a particular
kind of space; so even if they are simpler, that doesn’t necessarily argue that
non-discrete spaces can’t be fundamental. The empty set ∅ is probably simpler
than ℵω, but in ZFC they are equally fundamental objects (i.e. sets).
Similar arguments apply to homotopy spaces, i.e. ∞-groupoids. One of the
central insights of category theory and homotopy theory is that no class of
mathematical objects should be considered without the corresponding notion of
isomorphism or equivalence: we study groups up to isomorphism, spaces up to
homeomorphism, categories up to equivalence, and so on. Thus, all mathemat-
ical collections naturally form groupoids, or more generally∞-groupoids, when
equipped with the relevant “notion of sameness”. (See [102] for further philo-
sophical discussion of this point.) The set41 of all groups is much less tractable,
and much less interesting, than the category of all groups; so even though the
former is “simpler” in the sense of containing no nontrivial automorphisms, it
is reasonable to regard the latter as being at least as fundamental.
One possible objection to treating spaces as fundamental is to ask how we
should decide which rules our “spaces as fundamental” should satisfy. Indeed, we
have already seen that there are different kinds of synthetic topology adapted
for different purposes, modeled respectively by consequential, continuous, or
smooth ∞-groupoids. Moreover, other kinds of synthetic mathematics, such as
synthetic domain theory, synthetic differential geometry, and other fields waiting
to be developed, will have their own toposes and their own type theories.
However, if we shift perspective a bit, we can see that this is a feature rather
than a bug. Why must we insist on singling out some particular theory as “the”
foundation of mathematics? The idea of a “foundation for mathematics” stems
from the great discovery of 20th century logic that we can encode mathematics
into various formal systems and study those systems mathematically. But in
the 21st century, we are sufficiently familiar with this process that we no longer
need to tie ourselves to only one such system.42 Even ZFC has a role from this
point of view: it is a synthetic theory of well-founded membership structures!
Bell [17] makes an excellent analogy to Einstein’s theory of relativity. In
Newtonian physics, there is a special absolute “rest frame”, relative to which
all motion can be measured. There are moving observers, of course, but they
are second-class citizens: the standard laws of physics do not always apply to
them. They feel “fictitious forces”, like the centrifugal force and Coriolis force
on a spinning merry-go-round or planet, that are not really forces but just
manifestations of “truly” inertial motion in a non-inertial reference frame.
41or “proper class”
42In particular, it is meaningless to ask whether statements like the Continuum Hypothesis
are “true”; they are simply true in some systems and false in others. This perspective is very
natural to a category theorist, but has recently made inroads in set theory as well [47].
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By contrast, Einsteinian physics can be formulated equally well in any refer-
ence frame and obeys the same laws in each, with consistent rules for transform-
ing between reference frames. Some frames, called “(locally) inertial”, lead to
a simpler formulation of the laws; but often this is outweighed by the relevance
of some other frame to a particular problem (such as the non-inertial reference
frame of the Earth’s surface). The centrifugal and Coriolis forces are exactly as
real as any other force; in fact they are simply instances of gravitational force!
To an observer on the Earth’s surface, an inertial observer in a spaceship flying
by is the one who is spinning (along with the rest of the universe), thereby
feeling “fictitious” forces that cancel out these gravitational ones.
Similarly, in ZFC orthodoxy there is an absolute notion of “set” out of which
everything is constructed. Spaces exist, but they are second-class citizens, ulti-
mately reducible to sets, and the basic axioms of set theory don’t apply to them.
But from a pluralistic viewpoint, mathematics can be developed relative to any
topos, obeying the same general rules of type theory. We have consistent rules
for translating between toposes along functors, and there are some toposes in
which mathematics looks a bit simpler (those satisfying LEM or UIP). However,
there is no justification for regarding any particular topos or type theory as the
“one absolute universe of mathematics”. An observer in a topos of classical
mathematics can construct a topos of spaces in which all functions are contin-
uous, thereby explaining its different behavior. But an observer inside a topos
of spaces can also construct a topos of classical mathematics as the “discrete”
or “indiscrete” objects, whose different behavior is explained by the triviality
of their cohesion — and both points of view are equally valid. Just as modern
physicists switch reference frames as needed, modern mathematicians should be
free to switch foundational systems as appropriate.
This is particularly relevant for physicists and other scientists interested in
using mathematics rather than debating its Platonic existence. If a particular
synthetic theory is useful in some application domain (see e.g. Schreiber’s chap-
ter), we are free to take it seriously rather than demanding it be encoded in
ZFC. Set theory and 20th century logic were a crucial stepping-stone to bring
us to a point where we can survey the multitude of universes of mathematics;
but once there, we see that there is nothing special about the route we took.
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